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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Kelo v. City of
New London' has excited considerable debate, confusion and anxiety among
American judges, scholars, politicians and property owners. Following the
Court's holding that a municipality can use the eminent domain power to con-
demn non-blighted residential property for an urban renewal project, many
Americans have reacted with varying degrees of shock, disillusionment and
anger over what they perceive is an attack on their-heretofore sacrosanct-
property rights.2 However, while the public is correct to view Kelo with deep
I Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2 William Hoffman, Supreme Court Decision Sets More Property Fights, PAC. SHIPPER, Jul.
15, 2005 (stating that readers were concerned that "the ruling could make it costlier, financially
and politically, to develop logistics facilities"); Lynne Jeter, Eminent Domain Ruling From
[Vol. 110
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apprehension, this case does not represent a significant departure from the Su-
preme Court's early eminent domain jurisprudence. Rather, Kelo represents
only the most recent and most publicized of a long series of decisions in which
the Supreme Court has obscured the distinctions between governmental powers
3
and restraints 4 and, thus, eroded the Constitutional safeguards on private prop-
erty.
5
This Article argues that the intellectual uncertainty surrounding eminent
domain or "takings" jurisprudence has led to the erosion of Fifth Amendment
protections of private property. Specifically, this Article examines the two con-
cepts at the core of takings jurisprudence: (1) the Fifth Amendment's Public
Use Clause6 and (2) the "police power" of individual states. This Article argues
that the Supreme Court's inability to articulate principled boundaries between
these two concepts has deprived courts of the intellectual framework necessary
for precise analysis of the conflicting principles and interests involved in takings
jurisprudence, leaving courts and legislatures without a meaningful limiting
principle for government takings. This results in haphazard and poorly justified
court holdings, ad hoc judicial review and, ultimately, diminished property
rights for private citizens. Sadly, the lack of an intellectual framework also has
obscured possible solutions to the takings dilemma by denying critics an effec-
tive rubric for articulating alternatives to the Supreme Court's approach. As a
result, proponents of greater private property protections find themselves either
without a coherent alternative paradigm for advancing their interests or advocat-
ing a paradigm that actually derogates from these rights.7
There already is a great wealth of legal scholarship critiquing the inco-
herence of 20th century takings cases and suggesting different tests or theories
SCOTUS Stuns Developers: Many Are Leery of the Private Property Rights Implications, Miss.
Bus. J. (SPECIAL SECTION), Aug. 8, 2005, at 6-7 (stating that the "news [of Kelo] sent ripple effects
throughout real estate and land development circles").
3 Specifically, the court has obscured the amorphous "police power."
4 Specifically, the court has obscured the Fifth Amendment's restriction on government ap-
propriations of private land, or "takings."
5 See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. 273 (1887).
6 Scholars variously refer to this as the "Takings Clause," the "Compensation Clause," or
even the "Accommodation Power," depending on what facet they desire to emphasize. See, e.g.,
Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149 n.1 (1971)
("takings provision" or "compensation provision"); Catherine R. Conners, Back to the Future: The
"Nuisance Exception" to the Just Compensation Clause, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 139 (1990) ("Com-
pensation Clause"); David B. Fawcett III, Comment, Eminent Domain, the Police Power, and the
Fifth Amendment: Defining the Domain of the Takings Analysis, 47 U. PiTT. L. REV. 491, 492
(1986) ("just compensation clause"); John J. Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommo-
dation Power: Antidotes for the Takings Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1021 (1975) ("Accommodation Power").
7 See discussion infra Part V.A.
20081
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for restoring order to this area of law. 8 Some scholars have suggested that state-
level legislation is the best method for striking a balance between private rights
and public needs.9 Others advocate abandoning the Court's current expansive
interpretations of the police power and the Public Use Clause in favor of a more
restrictive--or 'conservative'-understanding. However, despite the volumes
that have been written on takings jurisprudence and near-universal agreement
that this subject is convoluted,10 there is almost no published literature directly
addressing the question of why takings law became so muddled to begin with.
Is the current confusion attributable to sloppy application of precedent by 20th
century Supreme Court Justices, or is the problem more fundamental? Answer-
ing this question is an essential precondition to rebuilding the takings rubric into
a tool capable of yielding consistent court holdings that are both logically defen-
sible and capable of balancing private rights against public needs. As such, the
"why" question is the focus of this Article.
This Article asserts that the current incoherence of Supreme Court tak-
ings jurisprudence is not a recent development but dates back to the 1830s. It
further argues that the internal logic of takings analysis had become unviable
much earlier than most scholars have imagined, and that the process of deterio-
ration actually was complete by the end of the 19th century."
This analytic deterioration can be traced to three specifically-
identifiable causes that are largely overlooked by mainstream takings scholar-
ship. These are (1) the fact that the concept of a state police power first
emerged in disputes over the division of state and national power, i.e. federal-
8 See generally Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1
(2003); Edward J. Sullivan & Nicholas Cropp, Making it Up-"Original Intent" and Federal
Takings Jurisprudence, 35 URB. LAW. 203 (2003).
9 See, e.g., Alan T. Ackerman, Condemnation Case of the Year: County of Wayne v. Hath-
cock, 45 ALI-ALR COURSE OF STUDY 269, 364-65 (2005) (discussing the embodiment of eminent
domain in state legislation); Frank A. Vickory & Barry A. Diskin, Advances in Private Property
Protection Rights, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 561, 605 (1997) (discussing state legislation that creates prop-
erty rights that go beyond the constitutional guarantees).
10 William P. Barr, Henry Weissman & John P. Frantz, The Gild That is Killing the Lily: How
Confusion Over Regulatory Takings Doctrine is Undermining the Core Protections of the Takings
Clause, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 484 n.242 (2005) (stating that "the predominant characteris-
tic of [takings] law is a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible results" (quoting Joseph
L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964))). I do not suggest that all
scholars reach the same conclusions about the direction that takings jurisprudence should take.
My point is only that most scholars begin with the premise that this area of law is confusing.
11 Many scholars begin their analysis with the 1887 case Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.
Ct. 273. See, e.g., Goutam U. Jois, Can't Touch This! Private Property, Takings, and the Merit
Goods Argument, 48 S. TEX. L. REv. 183, 215 (2006); Michael J. Davis, Lucas and Takings: Pri-
vate Property Redefined, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Spring 1993, at 83, 84; Michael J. Quinlan,
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Just Compensation and Environmental Regulation-
Establishing a Beach Head Against the Evisceration of Private Property Rights, 12 TEMP. ENVTL.
L. & TECH. J. 173 (1993). This Article argues that Mugler merely brought the latent imprecision
of earlier takings cases to the fore. Thus, Mugler is better viewed as an analytic endpoint in un-
derstanding the tangled web of takings jurisprudence.
[Vol. 110
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ism; (2) the temptation to expand the scope of the Public Use Clause to encom-
pass government takings for public needs beyond simple use by the public; and
(3) the fact that the Public Use Clause and the police power evolved from two
separate bodies of Supreme Court precedent, which did not begin to converge
until the Fourteenth Amendment was passed in 1866 and the process of "incor-
poration" began.
12
By analyzing the specific causes of takings jurisprudence deterioration
outlined above, this Article identifies three driving mechanisms for liberalizing
takings law, all of which developed before the end of the 19th century, and all of
which are present in the major eminent domain holdings of the 20th century. A
comparison of these mechanisms and their causes to the alternative theories
advanced by the advocates of increased private property protection demonstrates
that the incoherence of takings jurisprudence is a fundamental problem inuring
in the current takings discourse and that proponents of increasing private prop-
erty protections must establish a new analytical framework for takings jurispru-
dence before they can effect meaningful change.
II. METHODOLOGY
This analysis is divided into seven sections. Part III traces the Supreme
Court's increasingly expansive interpretation of the Public Use Clause from the
early "mill acts cases" through the 1850s when the Supreme Court began "in-
corporating" the various provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Part IV outlines the development of the "police power" beginning with
Chief Justice John Marshall's first articulation of the concept in 1827 through
the incorporation era. Part IV demonstrates how the Supreme Court increas-
ingly broadened the application of the police power while retaining its narrow
theoretical underpinnings in the common law of nuisance.
Parts V and VI analyze how forcibly conjoining the police power and
Public Use Clause through incorporation transformed the latent imprecision in
each line of cases into points of tension in the new combined takings analysis.
Part VII then briefly addresses several prominent takings cases from the latter
half of the 20th century and demonstrates that the Court's failure to address
these points of tension when they first emerged in the mid- 19th century directly
12 Incorporation is the process by which the states adopted the Bill of Rights through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to conventional wisdom, the Takings
Clause was not officially incorporated until 1897 with the case of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 478-79 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the times when the various pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights were incorporated against the states). However, the Supreme Court
began using the language and logic of eminent domain analysis in state takings cases far earlier in
the century. See discussion infra Part VI. This Article emphasizes the underlying logic of Su-
preme Court takings jurisprudence in the 19th century and does not view the Court's disclaimer of
its analysis as a bar to discussion.
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caused the three mechanisms of liberalization that muddle takings jurisprudence
in the 21 st century.
The final three sections argue that the dichotomous police power/public
use analytic framework which underlies the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
cannot be applied in a consistent and principled manner even by restoring these
terms to their original narrow ideations, as conservative judges and scholars
advocate. Part VIII examines the arguments of two of the most prominent con-
servative critics of the Supreme Court's expansive reading of the Public Use
Clause, Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas and Professor Richard Ep-
stein13 and demonstrates how their proposed formulations of takings jurispru-
dence ineluctably succumb to the same theoretical and practical flaws as the
approach embraced by the Kelo majority. Part VIII argues that these failings
stem from the fact that Kelo's critics challenge only the modem application of
takings jurisprudence rather than its flawed theoretical predicates.
This Article concludes that courts must abandon the flawed police
power/public use dichotomy in favor of a more nuanced analytical framework
and proposes a multi-tiered jurisprudential test based on the new framework,
which allows for greater flexibility and precision than is possible under any re-
formulation of the current takings model.
III. "ROUND HOLES": THE EARLY EVOLUTION OF THE "PUBLIC USE" CLAUSE
Though both the police power and the Public Use Clause inform takings
jurisprudence, only the latter finds direct expression in the text of the Constitu-
tion.' 4 Specifically, the Fifth Amendment states "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."' 5 The exact meaning of this
pithy injunction is the subject of great scholarly debate, especially in the wake
13 Professor Epstein is the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, Faculty
Director for Curriculum, and the Director of the Law and Economics Program at the University of
Chicago School of Law. See University of Chicago Law School, Richard Epstein,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/epstein (containing further biographical information) (last
visited Nov. 6, 2007).
14 The term "Police Power" is not mentioned once in the Constitution. However, if one takes
the argument that the police power is coterminous with a state's sovereignty to its logical conclu-
sion, then it is possible to argue that the Tenth Amendment, which states that "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to
the states respectively, or to the people," enshrines this principle. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
15 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
[Vol. I110
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of the Kelo decision.' 6 However, the contours of what constitutes a "public use"
have never been clear, even in the earliest days of the Constitution.17
Commenting on the Supreme Court's haphazard use of the term "public
use" in Kelo, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor stated that the Supreme Court's
application of the "public use" requirement "wash[ed] out any distinction be-
tween private and public use of property-and thereby effectively ... delete[s]
the words 'for public use' from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment."'
8
Without this clause, O'Connor further stated that "[niothing is to prevent the
State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping
mall, or any farm with factory."' 19 As a result, O'Connor concluded that "the
specter of condemnation [now] hangs over all property., 20
Justice O'Connor's now famous statements aptly capture many Ameri-
cans' belief that the Supreme Court has destroyed the "public use" requirement.
However, while Kelo may have many negative effects on the application, or
non-application, of the Public Use Clause, it is doubtful that this decision will
further erode the logical integrity of the clause. This is because the Public Use
Clause had become unviable long before the Kelo decision. Writing in 1985,
Professor Epstein commented that "[t]o judge from the cases and scholarship on
the subject, this chapter [on public use] largely deals with an empty question.'
Indeed, as early as 1949, a published comment in the Yale Law Journal con-
cluded that "so far as the federal courts are concerned neither state legislatures
nor Congress need be concerned about the public use test in any of its ramifica-
tions., 22 Given this long-standing doubt among scholars as to whether the Pub-
lic Use Clause functions as a significant limitation on takings, it is necessary to
ask whether this constitutional phrase ever has held meaning and, if so, what
that meaning was.
Some of the earliest Supreme Court cases construing the Public Use
Clause involve state statutes allowing a landowner to dam a waterway, and
thereby flood upstream land in order to build a water-powered mill. These
16 See, e.g., Norm Pattis, Not Public Use, But Necessity That Should Drive Land Takings,
CONN. L. TRIB., Jul. 25, 2005 (calling the Kelo decision "a grotesque perversion of the very rights
and liberties we celebrate"); Robert Solomon, Court Took Proper Tack in Kelo Case, CONN. L.
TRIB., Jul. 25, 2005 (praising "[t]he virtue of Kelo"); Jerry Stouk, Unfinished Edifice Lex, N.J.
L.J., Jul. 25, 2005 (calling Kelo a "high water mark for eminent domain").
17 See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896) ("The question
what constitutes a public use has been before the courts of many of the states, and their decisions
have not been harmonious .... ).
18 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
19 Id. at 503.
20 Id.
21 RicARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
161 (1985).
22 Comment, The Public Use Limitation in Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE
L.J. 599, 613-14 (1949).
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"Mill Acts" 23 required the owner to pay compensation to the owners of the
flooded land, sometimes in excess of 150% of that land's value.24 Further, the
mills were available to all members of the public for processing their grain, al-
beit it at a fee. 25 Because these mills were so important to, and would be used
by, the public at large, the Supreme Court in Township of Burlington v. Beasley
had little difficulty holding that the use was just as public as a highway or rail-
road:
It would require great nicety of reasoning to give a definition of
the expression 'internal improvement 26 which.., would show
that the means of transportation were more valuable to the peo-
ple of Kansas than the means of obtaining bread. It would be a
poor consolation to the people of this town to give them the
power of going in and out of the town upon a railroad, while
they were refused the means of grinding their wheat.27
That mills which every citizen could use are "public uses" within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment is too obvious to require further elaboration.
Indeed, Justice Thomas cites these in his Kelo dissent as the paragon of public
uses, even while advocating for a narrow interpretation of the phrase.28 How-
ever, although the Beasley Court's holding clearly was consistent with the Pub-
lic Use Clause, the Court's rationale for the holding was highly problematic.
The Beasley Court actually advanced two rationales for upholding the
constitutionality of this mill act. The most obvious rationale was that mills were
like roads because they were publicly accessible. However, a brief examination
of the above passage reveals that the Court, perhaps unintentionally, also
grounded its holding on the fact that the mills were necessary for the public to
have a "means of grinding their wheat., 29 This public necessity argument is
wholly irrelevant to the Fifth Amendment question of whether the mills actually
were used by the public. Having concluded that the condemnations were for a
"public use," the Beasley Court need not-and should not-have continued its
inquiry. Moreover, it is not even clear whether the public use rationale or the
public necessity rationale was the driving force behind the holding. This unfor-
23 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 512 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
24 EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 174.
25 Township of Burlington v. Beasley, 94 U.S. 310, 314 (1876).
26 "Internal improvement" was the language used by a Kansas statute to describe projects built
on land condemned using eminent domain and which were required by law to be open to all
members of the public, such as highways, railroads, canals, and government buildings. Id. at 313.
Thus, the term is merely a synonym for "public use" even under the term's strictest construction.
27 Id. at 313-14.
28 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 512 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
29 Beasley, 94 U.S. at 314.
[Vol. 110
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tunate dictum marks the beginning of the Public Use Clause's intellectual dete-
rioration.
Nine years after Beasley, the Supreme Court addressed another mill act
in Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. 30 The act under consideration in Head
was a so-called "General Mill Act," which authorized property owners to use
the eminent domain power to build mills for private uses such as manufacture.3'
In holding this mill act constitutional, the Head Court blandly remarked that
various lower courts had upheld these condemnations for private enterprise "by
reason of the advantages inuring to the public from the improvement of water-
power and the promotion of manufactures '32 and that such judicial practice was
"confirmed by long usage or prior decisions. 33 The Court then proceeded to
string cite prior state and lower federal court precedent without comment.
34
The Head decision should have refocused the public use inquiry. In-
stead, the Head Court chose to raise the public use question explicitly, comment
on its breadth, and then duck the question entirely:
The question whether the erection and maintenance of mills for
manufacturing purposes under a general mill act.., can be up-
held as a taking, by delegation of the right of eminent domain,
of private property for public use, in the constitutional sense, is
so important and far reaching, that it does not become this court
to express an opinion upon it, when not required for the deter-
mination of the rights of the parties before it. We prefer to rest
the decision of this case upon the ground that such a statute,
considered as regulating the manner in which the rights of pro-
prietors of lands adjacent to a stream may be asserted and en-
joyed, with a due regard to the interests of all, and to the public
good, is within the constitutional power of the legislature.35
Commentators such as Epstein have been quick to point out that the
Head Court utterly fails to provide "an explanation of how the confrontation
with the [Public Use Clause] can be avoided., 36 The Court clearly states the
property was taken under the power of eminent domain and even discussed pos-
sible rationales for including these kinds of "public necessity" takings within the
"public use" rubric. In light of these statements, the Court's assertion that "the
question ... is so important and far reaching, that it does not become this court
30 Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885).
31 Id. at 10.
32 Id. at 19.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 19-20.
35 Id. at 20-21.
36 EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 171.
2008]
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to express an opinion upon it" borders on the comic. However, as forceful as
these criticisms are, they fail to capture the full extent of the violence that the
Head Court did to public use jurisprudence.
The U.S. Supreme Court could have avoided a direct conflict with the
Public Use Clause by categorizing the Mill Act Cases as a constitutional oddity
justified by history, court precedent and little else. While such an approach
would not have been wholly intellectually satisfying, it would have allowed the
Court to reach the same result while confining the damage done to the Public
Use Clause to one rarified subset of cases. Scholars and courts trying to read
coherence back into the Supreme Court's jurisprudence have favored this ap-
proach.37 Indeed, when the Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with the same
facts sixteen years before Head, the Court took this more honest approach, stat-
ing that:
It is difficult to reconcile these statutes, upon principle, with the
constitutional rights of the citizen. The property in such cases is
not taken into possession and use by the public in its corporate
capacity to be devoted to some purpose supposed to be for the
general good; nor (unless the mills when established are to be
deemed public mills... ) do[es] the.., public derive any direct
38
use, profit, or convenience from them ....
Once the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged this obvious constitutional
reality, it went on to note that
the incidental benefit to the public from turning to use all the
power in running streams may be very great, and that, such is
the nature of property in and along these streams, the power
cannot be made fully available without such a law as that we are
considering.39
Ultimately the court chose the socially useful-rather than the constitu-
tionally defensible-result. However, the court was careful to note that its re-
sult was informed more by the overwhelming weight of precedent than by any
attempt at a coherent takings analysis. 4°
37 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 513-14 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing).
38 See, e.g., Miller v. Troost, 14 Minn. 365, 366 (1869).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 366-67 ("[H]ad not similar laws, in states having constitutional restraints similar to
ours, been uniformly sustained by the courts, we should hesitate long before upholding this one.
The decisions, however, are so numerous, and by courts of so great authority, that we are con-
strained to hold the law to be constitutional.").
[Vol. 110
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Regardless of the merits of the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding, it
is at least clear what factors informed its decision. Future courts attempting to
apply Miller's reasoning would not be greatly confused by a judicial attempt to
force the round peg of "public benefit" into the square hole of "public use." The
same cannot be said in Head. By stating that "public use" is so broad that it can
encompass private uses with incidental public benefits and yet so narrow that it
is not implicated by a government-sanctioned taking of land for private enter-
prise, the Head court interprets the Public Use Clause out of existence. Indeed,
because the breadth of the exception is so much greater than the narrow rule, the
Head Court's holding actually has the dramatic effect of transmogrifying the
public use restraint into an affirmative grant of power for government takings
that incidentally benefit the public. This result would not have occurred if the
Court either ignored the public use requirement or stretched it to encompass
public benefits. However, by deviating from the Constitution in both ways, the
Supreme Court was left with little choice but to concoct an inscrutable-and not
surprisingly unnamed-governmental power possessing the precise dimensions
of the void left by the public use restraint.
Based on the above cases, it is clear that by the mid-I 880s the Supreme
Court's precedent had evolved in such a way that a judge could uphold almost
any taking by employing one of three rationales: (1) the taking conferred an
incidental benefit on the public and, therefore, was a public use; (2) the taking
did not implicate the Public Use Clause but, rather, some mysterious legislative
power that acted as an affirmative grant in precisely the same situations where a
"public use" requirement would appear to impose a restriction; or (3) the takings
jurisprudence had become so convoluted that it was incapable of yielding prin-
cipled results. Thus, courts should simply dispense with the public use analysis
altogether and defer to the legislature's judgment as to whether the taking was
valid or not. The three rationales will be termed engines of liberalization be-
cause they provide easy grounds for judges to expand the scope of the Public
Use Clause in almost any conceivable situation.
The damage to the Public Use Clause that many people assume was
done in Kelo actually was complete after the Supreme Court decided Head in
1885. All of the confusion evident in the Supreme Court's cases since Head can
be traced to logical extensions of one or more of the three engines of liberaliza-
tion. Parts V and VI will demonstrate how the Supreme Court employed these
engines in late-19th and 20th century cases. However, it is first necessary to
examine the other major conceptual actor in takings jurisprudence: the state
police power.
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IV. "SQUARE PEGS": THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLICE POWER FROM GIBBONS
TO MILN
For most of the 19th century, the Public Use Clause only bound the fed-
eral government.4 1 Because the federal government possessed only those pow-
ers specifically enumerated in the Constitution, any action had to be rationalized
in terms of one of those powers. Though the Public Use Clause was a restraint
on government power rather than a grant, interpreting this clause broadly al-
lowed the federal government to condemn land for anything that could be
deemed a "public use" even where such an action could not be justified as "nec-
essary and proper" for the advancement of another enumerated power, such as
the commerce power.
In contrast to the federal government, the states retained plenary legisla-
tive power except where they had explicitly delegated the power to the federal
government through the Constitution. Prior to the incorporation of the Takings
Clause, the only limitations on a state's power to condemn land were its own
constitution and laws. This is significant because, until the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, courts expounding on the various types of state power
would not need to consider any overlap with a federal public use restraint in
their analyses. As a result, the body of case law surrounding the police power
developed in isolation from the public use line of cases.
Unlike the public use limitation, the police power is not mentioned
anywhere in the text of the Constitution. Nor do any of the founding-era docu-
ments reference this power as such. Rather, this power-at least insofar as it
has a definitive legal meaning-is entirely of judicial creation.
The first explicit reference to a "police power" comes from U.S. Su-
preme Court Justice John Marshall's opinion in Brown v. State of Maryland.43
In Brown, the Court was faced with the question of whether a state lawfully
could require foreign importers to obtain a license from the state or whether this
power had been ceded to the federal government through the Constitution. Be-
cause Brown was an early federalism case, the Supreme Court had an opportu-
nity to discuss the various powers that states possessed vis-A-vis the federal
government. The Court noted:
The power to direct the removal of gunpowder is a branch of
the police power, which unquestionably remains, and ought to
remain, with the States .... The removal or destruction of in-
fectious or unsound articles is, undoubtedly, an exercise of that
41 See James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of
Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 333 (1999).
42 It should be noted that many states either expressly provided for compensation in certain
cases or provided this as a matter of state policy. However, this did not necessarily mean that the
taken property had to be for a "public use."
43 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419,431 (1827).
[Vol. 110
HeinOnline  -- 110 W. Va. L. Rev.  722 2007-2008
THE POLICE POWER AND "PUBLIC USE"
power, and forms an express exception to the prohibition we are
considering. Indeed, the laws of the United States expressly
sanction the health laws of a State. 44
In Gibbons v. Ogden, decided three years earlier, Justice Marshall stated that
"[t]he acknowledged power of a State to regulate its police, its domestic trade,
and to govern its own citizens, may enable it to legislate on this subject [com-
merce] to a considerable extent., 45
Courts and commentators have not been able to reach a stable consensus
as to the scope of the police power. Some judges and commentators have held
that this refers only to the states' powers to abate nuisances and protect against
threats to the public health and safety.46 Under this narrow view, the term "po-
lice power" is closely linked with the state's common law powers to abate nui-
sances.47 Others have interpreted the term to encompass the entire array of
powers remaining with the several states after they ratified the constitution.48
Under this view, the "police power" is synonymous with the "residuary sover-
eignty" that James Madison described in Federalist 6249 and is "coterminous
with the scope of a sovereign's police powers. 5° Yet a third perspective, intro-
duced by the Supreme Court in the now infamous Lochner opinion, attempts to
find a middle ground between these two extremes by characterizing the police
power as
certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of each State in the
Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the exact de-
scription and limitation of which have not been attempted by
44 Id. at 443-44.
45 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,208 (1824).
46 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 560 (1991) (stating that "[t]he States'
traditional police power is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and
morals"); Christopher Wolfe, Moving Beyond Rhetoric, 57 FLA. L. REv. 1065, 1075 (2005) (stat-
ing that "traditional police powers. . . extend to the protection of public health, safety, welfare,
and morals").
47 See, e.g., David A. Thomas, Finding More Pieces for the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting
History Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. CoLO. L. REv. 497, 544 (2004) (asserting that "police power
regulations are valid if related to preserving or protecting the public health, safety, morals, or
welfare").
48 See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 471, 475 (2004); Thomas, supra note 47, at 510 (discussing the perception of "'police
power' being commonly equated with powers of sovereignty, especially with respect to the
states").
49 THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 320 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001) ("[T]he equal vote allowed to each state, is at once a constitutional recognition of the
portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual states, and an instrument for preserving that
residuary sovereignty."); see also Barros, supra note 48, at 475.
50 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 501 (2005) (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Mid-
kiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984)).
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the courts. Those powers, broadly stated, and without, at pre-
sent, any attempt at a more specific limitation, relate to the
safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public.5'
Each of these views finds some support in the early case law that developed the
term.52 However, the overwhelming majority of modern scholars embrace the
police power paradigm in which the police power is equivalent to the state's
residual sovereignty.53
Notwithstanding legal scholars' near-universal acceptance of the "po-
lice-power-equals-all-state-power" paradigm, this position is unsatisfactory in
several important respects. First, to the extent that police power is a mere syno-
nym for state power, the term possesses almost no analytical utility. Thus, justi-
fying a state's actions as a "lawful exercise of the police power" merely substi-
tutes conclusion for analysis and description. Read according to the majority
view, this quote means only that "the state's action is lawful because it is law-
ful." There is good reason to be suspicious of logic this circular or to believe
that the Supreme Court coined a term for a non-starter. A second reason to re-
ject this rationale is that the fact that the text of the Brown v. Marylant 4 and
Gibbons v. Ogden55 opinions strongly suggest that Justice Marshall meant the
term "police power" to connote something vastly more limited than the entire
panoply of the states' "residual sovereignty."
Proponents of the "residual sovereignty" view of the early police power
often point to the broader meaning that the word "police" held in the early
1800s as support for their position. One example of this is D. Benjamin Barros'
recent article, The Police Power and the Takings Clause.56 In this article, Bar-
ros argues that
[a]t the time, "police" had several meanings relating to govern-
ment. The term was used to refer broadly to civilization or civil
organization, and "public police" meant the equivalent of public
policy. From these usages, the term "police" evolved to mean
the regulation and administration of the civil community and
the enforcement of the civil community's laws and public or-
der.5
7
51 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), overruled by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
52 See infra Part VII.
53 See Thomas, supra note 47, at 510.
54 25 U.S. 419 (1827).
55 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
56 Barros, supra note 48.
57 Id. at 475.
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This Article does not quarrel with Mr. Barros' proposition that the word "po-
lice" may have included a wide range of meanings in the 1800s and that some of
these were quite general. However, the fact that this term could have a broad
meaning in some circumstances does not justify the assumption that Marshall
intended this broad meaning to attach to the "police power." This is especially
true where the earliest opinions using the term contain strong textual evidence
of a narrower meaning.
Justice Marshall refers to the specific power that Maryland exercised in
Brown as "the power of the State to tax, 58 "the general power of taxation ' 59 and
"the taxing power"60 at various points in his opinion. At no point does Marshall
state that this power is a subset of the police power. Further, when speaking
more broadly about state power as a whole, Marshall refers to this body of "re-
sidual sovereignty" simply as "State power"6' and "powers which remain in the
States. 62 If Marshall intended the police power to encompass the totality of
state sovereignty, it is strange that he used these much broader terms in every
reference to the full universe of state power. In fact, Marshall did not use the
term police power when talking about "state power" even once in the opinion.
The fact that the Marshall Court intended the police power to refer only
to laws relating to public health and safety is also evident from Gibbons v.
Ogden. There, Justice Marshall explicitly acknowledged that other legal schol-
ars had referred to police powers in terms broader than his own: "this exclusive
grant is a law regulating commerce; although, in some of the discussions else-
where, it had been called a law of police."63 Nonetheless, Marshall took great
care to distinguish his police power from other types of governmental power.
"[W]ith regard to the quarantine laws, and other regulations of police, respecting
the public health in the several States, they do not partake of the character of
regulations of the commerce of the United States." 64 Thus, when Marshall re-
fers to "[t]he acknowledged power of a State to regulate its police, its domestic
trade, and to govern its own citizens," 65 it is clear that he intends this sentence to
be read as a list of separate-though overlapping---categories of state power and
that no one of these listed powers encompasses both itself and the other two.
Were this not the case, then this text would be ludicrously redundant. Barros'
conclusions regarding the general usage of "police" in the 18th century may be
valid as general propositions, however, they cannot be more probative of what
58 Brown, 25 U.S. at 441 (1827).
59 Id. at 439.
60 Id. at 442.
61 Id. at 435.
62 Id. at 441.
63 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 26 (1824) (emphasis in original).
64 Id. at 178.
65 Id. at 208.
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the Supreme Court intended the police power to mean than the Court's own
statements.
After Ogden and Brown, the fact that the police power is only a subset
of "state power" is at least reasonably clear from Marshall's language. How-
ever, this clarity began to erode as early as ten years after the Brown decision.
In 1837, the Supreme Court returned to the issue of whether a state could pass
laws that affected interstate and international commerce in Mayor of New York
v. Miln.66 In Miln, the Court addressed a law passed by the City of New York
that required the masters of ships coming into the Port of New York to provide
the authorities with the names of all foreign passengers and which imposed
large fines if foreign paupers were brought into the country. Miln challenged
this law as an attempt by a state to regulate interstate commerce. 67 The city
claimed that it had the power to regulate paupers as a health and safety law that
fell within the state's police powers.68 Writing for the Court, Justice Philip
Barbour noted that this case was governed by Justice Marshall's earlier opinions
in Ogden and Brown.69 Relying heavily on these cases, Barbour stated that it
was in "the general power of the states to regulate their own internal police, and
to take care that no detriment come to the commonwealth., 70 Barbour further
opined that it is as "competent and as necessary for a state to provide precau-
tionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possi-
bly convicts; as it is to guard against the physical pestilence, which may arise
from unsound and infectious articles imported, or from a ship . ... ,,7' By char-
acterizing this law as a "precautionary measure" to protect the state from moral
and physical hazards, Barbour brought the regulation in issue squarely within
the ambit of the narrow health and safety conception of the police power articu-
lated by Justice Marshall in Ogden and Brown. However, while the Miln Court
correctly captured the principle articulated in those earlier cases, it confused
some of their reasoning.
After characterizing the New York law as an exercise of the police
power, Justice Barbour went on to discuss the police power more generally. In
this regard he said,
[A] state has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction
over all persons and things, within its territorial limits, as any
foreign nation; where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or re-
strained by the constitution of the United States. That, by virtue
of this, it is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty
66 36 U.S. 102 (1837).
67 See id. at 131.
68 See id. at 142-43.
69 See id. at 134.
70 Id. at 142.
71 Id. at 142-43.
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of a state, to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its
people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and every
act of legislation, which it may deem to be conducive to these
ends.... That all those powers which relate to merely munici-
pal legislation, or what may, perhaps, more properly be called
internal police, are not thus surrendered or restrained .... 72
This statement is significant because Barbour equates the state's power
"to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of [the] people" with an "inter-
nal police" power.73 This is a far broader statement of the police power than
Justice Marshall advanced only ten years earlier. To the extent that all legisla-
tion is in some way related to safety, happiness, prosperity and general welfare,
Barbour's statement of the police power swallows the whole of a state's "resid-
ual sovereignty. 74 Significantly, the list of examples of this power that Barbour
finds in prior court opinions all fall within the narrower conception of the police
power as preventing harm to the community from criminals and health haz-
ards.75
That the Miln Court significantly expands the conception of the police
power is evident from comparing Barbour's statements with those made earlier
by Justice Marshall. This, however, is not the full extent of the harm. By equat-
ing the police power with state sovereignty and then listing only examples of
this power that relate to harm prevention, it becomes unclear whether Miln has
expanded the police power to embrace all state powers, or shrunk state powers
to include only those of harm prevention. This would have had severe repercus-
sions for the federalist balance of power if Barbour's language had not been
entirely dicta.76 However, Barbour's equation of the police power with a state's
sovereignty provided the model that future Supreme Court opinions would cite
to and rely on.
The fact that the Miln Court misunderstood Justice Marshall's statement
of the police power's function and limits should now be clear. This leaves the
question of why the Miln Court became so greatly confused by Marshall's ar-
ticulation of the police power only ten years after the term was coined. Existent
legal scholarship has not addressed this question, however, this Article asserts
72 Id. at 139 (emphasis added) (words "internal police" emphasized in original).
73 Id. at 103.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 139-42. One notable example that the court provides is that "a state has a right to
punish any individual found within its jurisdiction, who shall have committed an offence within
its jurisdiction, against its criminal laws." Id. at 139-40. However, no example of government
power that does not involve restraining nuisance-like conduct or punishing criminals is given.
76 Miln only decided whether the law in question was a valid state regulation. Thus, the
court's further commentary on the scope of the police power was not needed to resolve the ques-
tion before it.
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that the Supreme Court's confusion is attributable to the fact that the police
power first emerged in federalism cases.
The precise issue in Ogden and Brown was whether the state law in
question was a law rooted in the power to regulate interstate commerce-which
the states had ceded to the federal government and could no longer exercise-or
some other type of power that remained with the state. To decide this constitu-
tional issue, Ogden and Brown needed only to state whether the law was one
rooted in the commerce power or not. It was not necessary to the Court's rea-
soning to decide precisely what power the state was exercising so long as it was
some power other than commerce. By framing the state's law as one primarily
designed to promote internal public health and safety, Justice Marshall effec-
tively demonstrated that the law was not primarily designed to regulate inter-
state commerce. Read correctly, Ogden and Brown only state that the police
power is not the interstate commerce power. These cases do not suggest that all
state laws must be exercises of the police power; indeed, Marshall explicitly
mentions a separate taxation power remaining with the state.77 This distinction
is subtle, but important.
The mistake that Miln makes is to treat Justice Marshall's merely illus-
trative example of a non-commerce-based state power as exhaustive. This is an
easy mistake to make because in Ogden and Brown, the law in question so
greatly affected commerce that it could only be characterized as the product of a
commerce or police power. However, the fact that only one of two characteriza-
tions was possible in these two cases in no way meant that these were the only
two characterizations that could be used in all cases. Unfortunately, Miln
missed this subtle distinction and, as a result, deprived the term "police power"
of its former ability to describe anything more specific than state power. This
error would have profound effects on later takings jurisprudence.
V. "FORCING THE ROUND PEG INTO THE SQUARE HOLE": THE CONVERGENCE
OF THE STATE POLICE POWER AND THE PUBLIC USE CLAUSE
A. The Conservative Model of Public Use and Police Power Interplay
At first blush, one would not think that the Public Use Clause and the
police power ever would become entwined. In its narrowest conception, the
Public Use Clause is implicated only when the government takes land for public
uses such as a road or courthouse. The police power, in contrast, has its roots in
the common law right of the state to prevent individuals from harming other
citizens or the public at large.78 The classic statement of this "anti-nuisance"
conception 79 is embraced by the Latin maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non lae-
77 See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 440-41 (1827).
78 See Thomas, supra note 47, at 543.
79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (2000) (elaborating on the elements of nuisance):
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das, or "use your property so as not to damage another's., 80 Thus, when the
state proscribes certain uses of property that do injure others, it is not taking
away a right that the property owner had to begin with. The state simply is ex-
ercising the right of self-defense on behalf of other citizens. For this reason, the
state has never been required to compensate a land owner for value lost due to
reasonable restrictions on land use.
Because the wrongful conduct of a property owner is the touchstone of
the common law of nuisance, this logic only extends to private actions that have
been declared "noxious." Its theory cannot extend to preventing uses of prop-
erty which cause harm, but which are not wrongful, and it has no sensible appli-
cation to laws that force individual property owners to bear the costs of govern-
ment improvements for the entire community.
Once incorporated against the states, the Public Use Clause falls on the
opposite end of the state power spectrum from the law of nuisance. Under the
narrow conception of the Public Use Clause, the state may exercise its power of
eminent domain to take land for a "public use" only if it compensates the prop-
erty owner. The logical distinction between these two inquiries becomes most
clear by asking whose current or proposed usage the court is examining. Under
a strict Public Use analysis, the question of whether the government can exer-
cise eminent domain is focused entirely on what the state plans to do with the
property after acquiring it. An anti-nuisance analysis, in contrast, focuses on
what the private property owner did with the land prior to the government ac-
tion. Properly understood, these inquiries not only are separate but utterly unre-
lated. This conservative model of the relationship between an "anti-nuisance
police power" and the Public Use Clause is best illustrated graphically.
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a
legal cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoy-
ment of land, and the invasion is either
(a) intentional and unreasonable, or
(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability
for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or
activities.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1757 (8th ed. 2004).
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Figure 1. Conservative Model of the Police Power and Public Use Clause
Preventing a Public Harm - - Creating a Public Benefit
State Power Continuum [
Preventing Recog- Taking for Public
nized Nuisances Uses (ex. court-
house & roads)
In theory, "public uses" are only a narrow category of public benefit be-
cause there are many ways in which the public at large can benefit from a prop-
erty-e.g., providing tax revenue to fund municipal services, providing aesthetic
beauty, etc. Public nuisances, in contradistinction, are only a small subset of
private land uses that may harm neighbors or the public at large or wrongfully
withhold benefits. Many perfectly lawful purposes that courts would not be
prepared to categorize as nuisances can cause annoyance or harm to the com-
munity in the wrong circumstances. Between these two extreme sets of state
actions, there is a vast logical gulf that encompasses all other state legislation
designed to create a public benefit or prevent a public harm. Thus, under this
rigid theoretical model, a police power analysis and a public use analysis would
never parallel one another, much less be confused.
B. The Interplay of Public Use and Police Power Concepts after Miln and
Head
The theoretical model of state power described above is in accord with
the most conservative conceptions of the police power and the Public Use
Clause. However, the Supreme Court never has embraced such narrow defini-
tions in its jurisprudence. When Justice Marshall first coined the term "police
power" in Brown, he grouped quarantine laws, restrictions on imports, siting
requirements for storage of dangerous materials like gunpowder, criminal laws
and other laws relating to public "health and safety" under the umbrella of the
police power.81 Criminal laws and regulations on siting and storage of explo-
81 See Brown, 25 U.S. at 427-28.
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sive materials are easy to reconcile with an anti-nuisance rationale.82 However,
it strains the logic of nuisance too far to state that it encompasses every possible
regulation designed to ameliorate hazards to public "health and safety." Thus,
the police power, as originally conceived by Justice Marshall, can most logically
be characterized as beginning with nuisances and covering all legislation aimed
at harm prevention. Graphically represented, this brings the scope of the police
power to the dotted middle line separating the prevention of public harm from
conference of a public benefit. It does not encompass those laws that seek to
improve public welfare through affirmative state action.
Both judges and scholars have remarked that the line separating harm
prevention from benefit conference is often difficult to locate, because elements
83of both may be present in any given case. Even Epstein acknowledges that
"some uncertainty must be tolerated at the edges."'84 Nonetheless, acknowledg-
ing some "uncertainty at the edges" does not justify destroying the distinction
altogether. To state that an initiative to give educational scholarships to all of its
citizens is a law relating to "health and safety" is to stretch the term so far as to
divorce it from any meaning. The same could be said of an attempt to charac-
terize an average middle-class home that complies with all fire, zoning and
health codes as a nuisance because it wrongfully deprives the state of the tax
revenue that it would receive if a shopping mall was built on that property.
By conflating the police power with the whole of state sovereignty,
Miln extended the scope of the police power up to the limits of state sover-
eignty. 85 At the very least, the post-Miln police power abuts the public use re-
striction. However, if the public use restriction is simultaneously misread as an
affirmative grant of government power, then "public use" becomes just another
subcategory of the police power. Displayed visually, Miln extended the scope
of the police power all the way to the right end of the state power spectrum
shown above.
Had the Supreme Court done no more than conflate the police power
with the state's sovereignty, then the Public Use Clause and the police power
always would collide. However, by extending the Public Use Clause to em-
brace all "public benefits," the Supreme Court extended public use leftward on
the state power spectrum at least as far as the benefit creation/harm prevention
dividing line. This is displayed graphically in Figure 2.
82 Notably, Epstein, by requiring an actual "physical invasion," apparently would not consider
this to be an act of nuisance abatement.
83 See, e.g., Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Polk, 568 So. 2d 35, 48 (Fla. 1990)
("'[H]arm prevention' and 'benefit conferment' are simply two different ways of describing the
identical act."); Cotton Harness, Lucas and the Rebirth of Lochner, 2 S.C. ENvTL. L.J. 57, 66
(discussing "the debate of whether the law is aimed at 'harm prevention' or 'benefit conference,' a
distinction most often in the eyes of the beholder").
84 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 21, at 114.
85 See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 110 W. Va. L. Rev.  731 2007-2008
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
.... ...... re2: State Power After Miln and Head
4- Preventing a Public Harm * ' Creating a Public Benefit
State Power Continuum
Preventing Recog- 1 Exclusive Police Power Taking for Public
nized Nuisances Uses (ex courthouse
* Public Use & Police Power Overlap & roads)
Figure 2 demonstrates that the collision of the police power and the
Takings Clause is indeed messy. By interpreting "public use" as "public bene-
fit" and by interpreting "police power" as "state sovereignty," the police power
and the public use restraint overlap whenever a state government uses private
property to create a public benefit. As a result, any exercise of state power that
falls to the right of the harm/benefit line can be categorized either as an exercise
of the police power or of eminent domain with equal accuracy. The confusion
that this generates is obvious even to the casual observer. While the police
power, through its common law ancestry, implies that the state need not pay for
what it takes, the Public Use Clause specifically mandates compensation. How-
ever, the Head/Miln conception of state power simultaneously precludes and
requires compensation in many of the same cases. The confusion that this
framework creates should be distressingly evident. What is more perplexing,
however, is why this confusion was not foreseeable. The Supreme Court was
broadening its conception of the police power in Miln at almost the same time
that it was expanding the scope of the Public Use Clause in Beasley. This begs
the question of why the Court did not foresee that its two lines of jurisprudence
were on course for a messy collision. Why did the Court decide Head without
accounting for the inevitable overlap that the new "public benefit" would have
with its "police-power-as-all-state-power" line of jurisprudence? These ques-
tions have not been answered in any published literature on takings jurispru-
dence. More alarmingly, these questions have not even been asked. The over-
sight by legal scholars is unexplainable. However, the oversight by the Court
can be understood by reference to history.
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Prior to 1866, the Bill of Rights, including the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, applied only to actions by the federal government.8 6 In that
year, the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
which provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . ,87 This amendment began the process of "Incorporation" which, in
time, applied most of the substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights to the state
governments through "Due Process." Before the passage of this amendment,
the Takings Clause applied only to the federal government. To the extent that
states had not delegated their powers to Congress in the Constitution, they re-
tained plenary legislative power and were not bound by the Takings Clause. As
a corollary, the federal government possessed only those powers delegated to it
by the states and did not have "residual sovereignty" out of which a police
power could be carved. Thus, when Justice Marshall first articulated the
boundaries of the state police power in 1827, he could not have foreseen its
eventual merger with the federal public use restraint. Indeed, even as Justice
Barbour misapprehended Marshall's limited state police power, both the Civil
War and the Fourteenth Amendment remained on the distant horizon. Thus, no
matter how broadly he crafted the police power, Barbour could not have pre-
dicted its encroachment on the Court's public use jurisprudence. Viewed in this
light, the imprecision of the Supreme Court's early public use and police power
jurisprudence is far more understandable, even if no less unfortunate.
VI. "WHEN THE PIECES DON'T FIT, PRETEND THEY Do": THE INCOHERENCE OF
POST-INCORPORATION TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
Once the Takings Clause was incorporated against the states, any exer-
cise of that mysterious legislative power by a state would have to fall under the
umbrella of the police power along with everything else. Thus, by the 1880s,
the police power had become one of the primary engines of liberalization.
The increasing prominence of the police power as an engine of liberali-
zation in takings jurisprudence is problematic because the Supreme Court still
associated the police power with its anti-nuisance origins even as it was expand-
ing its conceptions of that power. Thus, any taking that was justified as an exer-
cise of the police power implicitly invoked anti-nuisance rationales which did
not require landowner compensation. The Public Use Clause, in contrast, re-
quired that the taking be both for a "public use" and that it be compensated as
necessary preconditions for an exercise of eminent domain. Merging the police
86 Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regula-
tion, 90 IOWA L. REv. 377, 395 ("As generally recognized, the primary purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to provide freed slaves and other African-Americans greater federal protection
from arbitrary exercises of state power.").
87 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added).
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power into an eminent domain analysis made contradiction inevitable. This, in
turn, added further confusion to takings analyses and increased the possibility
that a judge would rely on the punting engine to escape from the takings maze.
Despite the obvious problems with this takings model, Parts III and IV
demonstrate that this is exactly the rubric that the Supreme Court's earlier juris-
prudence compelled them to adopt when attempting to reconcile the police
power and the Takings Clause lines of jurisprudence post-Incorporation. This
model, and the Supreme Court's discomfort with it, is evident in the early Pro-
hibition-era case of Mugler v. Kansas.88
In Mugler, the state of Kansas outlawed the manufacture of alcohol and
statutorily declared all buildings and items used for such manufacture to be
"nuisances" subject to confiscation or destruction by the police.89 Mugler
owned a brewery, which he operated lawfully prior to the prohibition law.90
After the act was passed, Mugler continued to operate his brewery until the po-
lice destroyed the building and all of the bottles, beakers and other materials
inside of it.91
Mugler and the state advanced two very different conceptions of the po-
lice power before the Court. Citing a long chain of court holdings, Mugler
stated that "[a] legislative enactment cannot make that a nuisance which is not
such in fact"92 and that
[s]uch a legislative determination would also be void, because,
where the fact of injury to public health or morals did not exist,
as here, it would be a violation of the absolute right of the citi-
zen to follow such pursuit as he sees fit, provided it be not in
fact "injurious to the community.' 93
Based on this reasoning, Mugler argued that his brewery was not a nuisance and
that its destruction deprived him of property as much as if the state had taken it
for public use.94 Mugler further argued that, even if brewing could be deemed a
nuisance, this only would give the state the power to enjoin the activity, not to
88 123 U.S 623, 8 S. Ct. 273 (1887).
89 Id. at 656, 8 S. Ct. at 294 ("The thirteenth section declares, among other things, all places
where intoxicating liquors are manufactured, sold, bartered, or given away, or are kept for sale,
barter, or use, in violation of the act, to be common nuisances, and provides that upon the judg-
ment of any court having jurisdiction finding such place to be a nuisance, the proper officer shall
be directed to shut up and abate the same.").
90 Id at 656-57, 8 S. Ct. at 294. The arguments of counsel are only carried in the old Supreme
Court Reporter. Thus, the page numbers for the parallel citation only will be provided.
91 Id. at 670, 8 S. Ct. at 302.
92 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. at 290 (emphasis in original).
93 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. at 290.
94 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. at 291.
[Vol. I110
HeinOnline  -- 110 W. Va. L. Rev.  734 2007-2008
THE POLICE POWER AND "PUBLIC USE"
destroy the property.95 This argument was consistent with the traditional nui-
sance law principle that "where a nuisance is to be abated, the abatement must
be limited by its necessities, and no wanton injury must be committed. 96 Fur-
ther, Mugler advanced the novel argument that the state should be obligated to
compensate him for the loss of value even if he still retained possession of and
title to the land.97 In support, he cited Supreme Court precedent stating that
"[all] that is beneficial in property is the use." 98
The arguments of the attorney for the State of Kansas are captured in
the opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court.99 In holding against Mugler, the
Kansas Supreme Court articulated a wide interpretation of the police power con-
sonant with that adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Miln.'°° After articulat-
ing this sweeping "public good" police power, the Kansas court noted that, prior
to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states always had the
power to regulate the use of private property and that all property rights were
held subject to the police power of the state.10 The Kansas court then con-
cluded that the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of the Public Use Clause
had not diminished this power through a rather compelling argument. First, the
Kansas court stated that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to grant
equality to the former slaves and that the amendment should be construed ac-
cording to this goal. 0 2 The Kansas court then noted that the protection of brew-
ery owners had little relevance to this purpose. 0 3 Further, that court stated that
"[n]either the real estate nor the personal property is 'taken' by the state for pub-
lic use. The state obtains no title, no easement, no license-nothing. And the
owner is in nowise deprived of his property .... "104
Perhaps most convincingly, the Kansas court noted the practical conse-
quences of requiring the state to pay landowners for any diminution in value to
their property based on valid exercises of the police power:
We will suppose the case of a new state where, either because
no apparent necessity existed, or from inadvertence or neglect,
95 Id. at 292.
96 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. at 292.
97 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. at 293.
98 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. at 292.
99 This opinion is reprinted in the old Supreme Court Reporter immediately preceding
Mugler's arguments.
100 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. at 280 ("[A] government may regulate the conduct of its citizens
towards each other, and, when necessary for the public good, the manner in which each shall use
his own property.") (emphasis added)).
101 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. at 286.
102 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. at 283.
103 See 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. at 283.
104 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. at 279.
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 110 W. Va. L. Rev.  735 2007-2008
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
no statute was enacted against the keeping of gambling-houses.
... Must the state, as a condition precedent to the enforcement
of legislation against the evil, purchase and pay for the houses,
or their furniture and gambling devices, together with the good-
will of their business?... Think of the states being compelled
to buy up gambling-houses, brothels, and lotteries ...before
any statute for their suppression could be enforced!' 05
Based on the seemingly intolerable financial burden that compensation imposed
on states, the Kansas court concluded that if the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment had intended "a construction so degrading to the states, and so sub-
versive to their authority, it is doubtful if it would have been ratified by a single
member of the Union."' 6 Thus, the Kansas court concluded that no compensa-
tion was due to Mugler for his loss.
The arguments of Mugler and the Kansas Supreme Court have been
elaborated at such length for two reasons. First, each argument contains sub-
stantial logic and equity. It seems unfair for a business owner to invest heavily
in a factory or brewery and then have it destroyed a few years later because the
state legislature has outlawed his trade. In contrast, requiring the state to com-
pensate everyone who it wants to regulate would prove so burdensome as to be
unworkable. Second, despite the conflict between Mugler and the State of Kan-
sas, each side perfectly captures one of the strands of Supreme Court takings
jurisprudence. Mugler's statement that a taking can occur even when the land is
not directly 'used' by the public is well supported both by Beasley and Head.
However, Kansas' claim that the state police power encompasses all legislation
that furthers the "public good" is equally well supported by Miln.
Many scholars critical of contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence
begin their inquiries with Mugler, implying that, before this case, there was a
golden age of takings coherence.1°7 Indeed, Justice Thomas, in his Kelo dissent,
specifically references Head and earlier Mill Act Cases as examples of the cor-
rect approach to takings. 10 8 However, the fact that neither Mugler nor Kansas is
able to advance a broad definition of one concept without embracing a narrow
conception of the other forcefully demonstrates that the incoherence of takings
jurisprudence dates back far earlier than the Mugler opinion. The incorporation
of the Public Use Clause against the states only brought the latent imprecision of
105 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. at 283.
106 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. at 283.
107 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. at 283.
108 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 512-14 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("Those early grist mills were regulated by law and compelled to serve the public for a stipulated
toll and in regular order, and therefore were actually used by the public. They were common
carriers-quasi-public entities. These were 'public uses' in the fullest sense of the word, because
the public could legally use and benefit from them equally." (internal quotations and quotation
marks omitted)).
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Supreme Court police power and public use jurisprudence to the fore. The fact
that this conflict was both very real and quite unexpected in the 19th century is
apparent from an offiand but telling remark made by the Kansas Supreme Court
when hearing Mugler.
It is not a little remarkable that, while [the Public Use Clause]
has been in the constitution of the United States as a restraint
upon the authority of the federal government for nearly a cen-
tury, and while during all that time the manner in which the
powers of that government have been exercised has been
watched with jealousy, and subjected to the most rigid criticism
in all its branches, this special limitation upon its powers has
rarely been invoked in the judicial forum .... But while it has
been a part of the constitution as a restraint upon the powers of
the states only a very few years, the docket of this court is
crowded with [takings cases] .... 109
This statement illustrates the fact that the Public Use Clause and the police
power interacted in post-incorporation takings jurisprudence to create more con-
fusion than either concept had created when applied on its own. This strongly
suggests two conclusions. First, and perhaps most obviously, the Supreme
Court did not consider the impact of its Public Use jurisprudence when design-
ing the police power or the impact of the police power when interpreting the
Public Use Clause. Second, the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment was a
potent catalyst for generating confusion in later takings cases.
In Mugler, the Supreme Court could not ignore the glaring contradic-
tions in its two lines of takings jurisprudence or the fact that each party had sig-
nificant support from precedent. However, while the Court could not escape the
need to redefine the borders of the Public Use Clause and the police power, it
could have used this opportunity to acknowledge the unintended effects of in-
corporation on the logical coherence of takings jurisprudence and abandon the
old Public Use and/or police power mode of analysis in favor of something
more workable. Because no court could be expected to predict the Civil War
and the ensuing changes in the federal balance decades in advance, the prestige
of the Supreme Court would not have been diminished by admitting that the old
rubric was unworkable and by making fundamental changes. Regrettably, the
Court chose not to address the fundamental imprecision of its takings analysis
and, instead, simply shifted the positioning of the public use limitation and the
police power on the state power continuum. In so doing, the Court made several
new errors that would further confound takings jurisprudence.
The Mugler Court resolved the conflicting theories of the litigants by
increasing the scope of the police power while reducing that of the Public Use
109 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. at 277.
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Clause. In so doing, the Court employed some highly suspect logic. First the
Court noted that
[i]t would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, were it
held that 'if the government refrains from the absolute conver-
sion of real property to the uses of the public, it can destroy its
value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to
any extent . . . without making compensation, because, in the
narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use.
Such a construction would pervert the constitutional provision.
110
However, less than a paragraph after announcing this logical and seem-
ingly equitable rule, the Court stunningly announced that "[t]hese principles
have no application to the case under consideration""' because the state's action
was "exerted for the protection of the health, morals, and safety of the peo-
ple." ' 2 The Court then went on to state that all property is held subject to the
state's police power" 3 and that this power encompasses the state's ability to
"prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good
order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state,
develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity."'1 4 According to the
Mugler opinion, an act grounded in this broad police power "by the destruction
of property which is itself a public nuisance . . is very different from taking
property for public use .... ,,115 Finally, the Court noted that a state can declare
specific property uses to be nuisances through "valid legislation.,
' 6
The Supreme Court's ultimate holding that leveling the Mugler brewery
and destroying all of the objects in it was not an excessive abatement of the nui-
sance 117 is not as disturbing as the logic that the Court used to achieve this re-
sult. First, by stating that "[a]ll rights are held subject to the police power" and
then interpreting such power to include every possible act of state legislation,
the Supreme Court effectively subjects all private property rights to the caprices
of state legislatures. The only safeguard remaining on a person's property is the
flimsy requirement that the law depriving them of such property be "valid."'"18
110 Id. at 667-68, 8 S. Ct. at 300 (quotation marks omitted).
1I Id. at 668, 8 S. Ct. at 300.
112 Id., 8 S. Ct. at 300.
113 See id. at 663, 8 S. Ct. at 298.
114 Id., 8 S. Ct. at 298.
15 Id. at 669, 8 S. Ct. at 301.
116 Id. at 668, 8 S. Ct. at 301.
17 Id., 8 S. Ct. at 301.
118 Id. at 623, 8 S. Ct. at 287.
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What is perhaps most alarming about Mugler is that the Court's reaf-
firmation of the police-power-as-all-state-power paradigm is accompanied by an
intellectual retreat in the justification for the police power. 19 Mugler repeatedly
reasserts the links between the police power and its anti-nuisance origins.
Through this device, the Court is able to conclude that all property is subject to
the police power. This is an extremely significant statement, because it implies
that property ownership is conditional and that any valid state legislation depriv-
ing an owner of his property extinguishes the owner's rights in that property
ipso facto. Rather than a public use inquiry, this logic is a gross extension of
anti-nuisance principles that effectively precludes compensation even if the "po-
lice power" regulation takes property for such purposes as developing natural
resources or adding to the state's "wealth and prosperity."
Legal scholars interpreting Mugler are quick to point out that this case
unfolded during the height of the prohibition movement, and the Supreme
Court's holding that states can declare any long-legalized property uses to be
nuisances probably would not be extended beyond prohibition cases.' 20 There
undoubtedly is much truth in this position. However, this is not a ground to
dismiss the Mugler holding as an isolated historical accident. Regardless of
what moral and political views may have influenced the Court to find no taking
in this case, the Supreme Court reached its desired result by employing one of
the same engines of liberalization developed in earlier cases; namely holding
that the taking does not implicate the Public Use Clause but, rather, the state
police power. The fact that the Supreme Court is unlikely to ever again hold
that a state may declare whole industries to be per se nuisances does not defeat
the fact that the Court used the same principles to achieve the desired result as it
had in many past cases.
The only significant innovation in the Mugler opinion is the expansion
of the narrow nuisance rationale to buttress all exercises of police power, even
those that fall all the way to the right on the state power spectrum. It is possible
that this decision was based on a genuine belief that alcohol production truly
was a nuisance. However, the Court's forceful-yet unsupported-assertion
that "the present case must be governed by principles that do not involve the
power of eminent domain"' 2' also suggests a growing awareness by the Court
that takings law had grown distant from its historical justifications. Thus, if the
119 These areas of legislation logically extend to such specific state actions as the damming of
rivers, building of mills or mines, or other purposes more related to the public use limitation than
any notion of public health and safety. Thus, after Mugler, the police power arguably swallows
the Public Use Clause while mandating non-compensation in these instances. This achieves the
perverse effect of creating public uses through nuisance law.
120 See, e.g., Sidney J. Spaeth, Comment, The Twenty-First Amendment and State Control Over
Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REv. 161, 169-71 (1991);
Kevin Wendell Swain, Note, Liquor by the Book in Kansas: The Ghost of Temperance Past, 35
WASHBURN L.J. 322, 342 (1996).
121 Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668, 8 S. Ct. at 301 (emphasis added).
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Court was not willing to reduce the scope of the police power and the public use
limitation to reconnect these concepts with their original justifications then
some new rationale would have to be superimposed onto the takings framework
no matter how uneasy the fit.
Though the temperance movement ended almost a century ago, the en-
gines of liberalization developed in early case law to justify the holding of
Mugler remain viable and common today. Indeed, these engines are present in
most of the major 20th century takings cases and the police power still retains
its association with anti-nuisance principles.
VII. "IF NOT SENSIBLE, THEN PRACTICAL": TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE IN THE
MODERN ERA
A. Ordering the Chaos: Achieving Practical Results from an Incoherent
Analysis
The specific techniques that the Supreme Court developed in the 19th
century are (1) stating that the taking conferred an incidental benefit on the pub-
lic and, therefore, was a public use, (2) stating that the taking did not implicate
the Public Use Clause but, rather, some mysterious and extraordinarily flexible
legislative power, or (3) arguing that takings jurisprudence had become so con-
voluted and incapable of yielding principled results that ad hoc review was justi-
fied. 122
Stated tersely, these three engines respectively can be labeled as
"stretching," "shrinking," and "punting." Using the stretching engine, the Su-
preme Court can find the public use test to be satisfied by any public benefit.
This allows takings, but still requires compensation. Using the shrinking en-
gine, the Court can find that the Public Use Clause only requires compensation
when property is taken for "public use" and that the government appropriation
under consideration is not for a public use and, thus, does not trigger the re-
quirement to compensate. Because the Public Use Clause is read out of exis-
tence, some other state power (the police power) must be present in these situa-
tions. The third engine can be used in those few cases where the taking is not
defensible using the first two engines. This third engine also can provide auxil-
iary support for the other two and is named "punting" because it begins with an
acknowledgement that takings jurisprudence is too convoluted to apply in a
principled fashion. Based on this, the Court is justified in deferring to legisla-
tive judgments about what is a valid "public use." This third engine is, perhaps,
the most powerful because the less comprehensible or more suspect the Court's
opinion, the stronger this rationale becomes.
The characterization of Supreme Court justifications for liberalizing tak-
ings jurisprudence as "stretching," "shrinking" and "punting" confessedly pos-
122 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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sesses an element of cynicism. However, this does not imply that the Justices of
the Supreme Court are acting with dishonorable intentions or are intentionally
distorting the takings law for activist purposes. In fact, the reason these three
justifications are labeled "engines" is because they tend to operate on their own
force even when the Court attempts to apply takings precedent to new situations
in good faith.
By the end of the 18th century, the police power and the Public Use
Clause had become so entangled and contradictory that a court simply could not
engage in a credible takings analysis without redefining the boundaries of one
concept or the other in individual cases. Thus, Justices engaged in takings dis-
course simply could not avoid employing one engine or the other. Similarly,
because both a broad view of the police power and a broad view of the Public
Use Clause were well entrenched in Supreme Court precedent, the decision of
where to set the boundaries of the concepts in any given case could only be arbi-
trary or based on the Justices' personal views of how the case should be de-
cided. For this reason, even the most assiduous Justice would be tempted to
dispense with the pretenses of engaging in a thorough takings analysis in favor
of deferring to the judgments of an elected body.
B. Stretching, Shrinking and Punting in Modern Supreme Court Jurispru-
dence: Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo
1. Berman
Many critics of 20th century takings jurisprudence believe that the Su-
preme Court substantially eviscerated the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth
Amendment in Berman v. Parker.123 Here, the Supreme Court upheld a plan by
Congress to use the eminent domain power to acquire and revitalize large sec-
tions of a "blighted" or slum neighborhood in Washington, DC in which area
Congress exercises the plenary powers of a state government. 24 One resident
who owned a parcel of land in this neighborhood protested the condemnation
because his particular property was commercial, not "slum housing." 125 This
resident claimed that the government's proposal violated the Public Use Clause
because the condemned properties would be turned over to a private agency for
private development and whereas clearing unsanitary slums is necessary for the
public health, safety and welfare, developing a "better balanced, more attractive
community" by condemning non-blighted land is not a public use.
26
The Berman Court found in favor of the federal government largely
through the punting engine. First, the Court found that "[a]n attempt to define
123 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
124 See id. at 33.
125 Id. at 31.
126 Id.
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[the police power's] reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must
turn on its own facts.' ' 127 After invoking the futility of engaging in takings
analysis, the Court stated that "when the legislature has spoken, the public inter-
est has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legisla-
ture, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs ... ,,'2' The
Court then noted that this rule applies even where the government power in
question is eminent domain.
129
After articulating the principle of near-absolute deference to the legisla-
ture, the Berman Court proceeded to make some of its most controversial state-
ments. First, the Court noted that "[o]nce the object is within the authority of
Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is
clear"'130 and that Congress has substantial latitude to determine the amount of
land and the procedures for effectuating this end.' 3' Second, and perhaps most
infamously, the Court stated that "the rights of these property owners are satis-
fied when they receive that just compensation which the Fifth Amendment ex-
acts as the price of the taking."'
' 32
Critics have noted that these statements read the public use requirement
out of takings jurisprudence.' 33 This view is supported both by the Court's
statements and by its refusal to scrutinize the government's means in any way.
Indeed, the statement that "[o]nce the object is within the authority of Congress"
strongly resembles a necessary and proper analysis.' 34 This is inappropriate for
two related reasons. First, the jurisprudential presumption that "no word [in the
Constitution] was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added"'135 militates against
reading the Public Use Clause as a mere duplication of the Necessary and
Proper Clause,136 which already prohibits the federal government from doing
anything that does not advance one of its enumerated powers. 137 For the Public
Use Clause to have meaning separate from the Necessary and Proper Clause it
must impose an additional restriction on government power. This is buttressed
127 Id. at 32.
128 Id.
129 See id.
130 Id. at 33.
131 See id.
132 Id. at 36.
133 GEORGE SKOURAS, TAKINGS LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT 44 (1998).
134 Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
135 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting
Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938)).
136 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
137 See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372 (1876); see also Sabri v. United States 541 U.S.
600, 613 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the Necessary and Proper Clause in terms of
Congress's spending power); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 511 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause in terms of a taking).
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by the fact that the phrase "nor shall" in the Public Use Clause connotes a re-
striction on government power and not an additional grant.
138
Second, if the Public Use Clause is a restriction on government power,
it cannot accomplish its essential function when the task of determining when
the restraint applies is entrusted to the party to be restrained. This is asking the
fox to guard the henhouse.
Scholars and judges have paid substantial attention to these shortcom-
ings in the Berman opinion. However, few of them have asked the more fun-
damental question of whether these shortcomings actually altered the outcome
of the analysis. This Article asserts that they did not for several reasons. First,
by employing the punting engine, Berman followed the overwhelming weight of
precedent. While the Court's statement that the Fifth Amendment requires only
compensation for property taken may be unsatisfying from a theoretical per-
spective, it cannot make any practical difference if the Court delegates the task
of deciding what a public use is to Congress. Because "the legislature, not the
judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs,"'1 39 adjudicating the question
of public use, even if done diligently, only serves to generate dicta.
The second basis for concluding that Berman reflected no meaningful
departure from earlier takings jurisprudence is that even if the Berman Court
had eschewed the punting engine, it still would be forced to apply either the
stretching engine or shrinking engine. Under the Supreme Court's broad police
power and public use constructs, the Court would be required to decide whether
the taking would be characterized as valid either under the police power or the
Public Use Clause. Thus, even if the Court decided to apply a public use analy-
sis, the ultimate question of what shape this analysis must take would remain
arbitrary.
The third consideration in evaluating the consequences of the Berman
Court's blunder is the most important but also the most overlooked. Because
the primary variable in post-incorporation takings jurisprudence is the determi-
nation of where to draw the boundary between the police power and the Public
Use Clause, the only two outcomes are that the taking would be deemed a valid
exercise of the police power or a legitimate taking.)40 Even assuming that it had
been theoretically possible for the Court to choose one engine over the other in a
non-arbitrary fashion-which it could not have done-this still would not have
affected the outcome of the case. A broad reading of either the police power or
the Public Use Clause would have allowed the government to appropriate the
land. The only question would be whether the government must pay for this
138 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 511 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 519.
140 Though not probable, it is theoretically possible that the court could find that the govern-
ment's purpose did not fall within the expansive umbrellas of either the police power or the Public
Use Clause. However, this is extremely unlikely considering the breadth ascribed to these two
concepts and the fact that there is no assertion that the government desires to take the land exclu-
sively to benefit an individual person or group.
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appropriation or not. 14' Thus, regardless of whether Berman decided to employ
a public use analysis and regardless of which variant of the analysis they em-
ployed had they chosen to do so, compensation invariably would be the only
question ultimately in play under the Fifth Amendment.
Based on these considerations, there is no reason to believe that Berman
effected any meaningful substantive change in the practical application of tak-
ings jurisprudence even if one were to accept the highly questionable proposi-
tion that, by the time of Berman, it remained possible to mangle takings theory
any further. The only innovation of the Berman Court is the discomfiting hon-
esty with which it applied well-established precedent.
2. Midkiff
The Supreme Court returned to the question of what government pur-
poses justified an exercise of eminent domain under the Public Use Clause in
the 1984 case, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff. 42 In Midkiff, the Hawaii
State Legislature determined that a significant percentage of all private land was
owned by a small number of citizens and that the vast majority of Hawaiian
citizens leased their land from this small group. 143 The legislature further de-
termined that this extreme concentration of land ownership dated back to feudal
landholding system that was in place prior to Hawaii's admission to the union
and that the continued existence of this pattern "was responsible for skewing the
State's residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the pub-
lic ... .,,144
Because the private landowners feared the tax consequences of selling
their land outright and because most tenants were too poor to purchase it, the
legislature created a redistribution system that allowed tenant's to request con-
demnation of their leased land and to purchase the fee simple at a price deter-
mined by the state government. 145 The legislature further allowed tenants to
borrow up to 90% of the purchase price from the government. 146 Shortly after
this program was instituted, several large landowners brought suit, claiming that
the legislature's explicit intent to transfer land from one group of private land-
141 Even this question is not clear cut. One of the few upshots for private property holders of
the Supreme Court's conflation of the police power and the Public Use restraint is that even a
valid exercise of the police power may require compensation of the property holder under the
regulatory takings rubric when the regulation "goes too far." Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393,415 (1922).
142 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
143 Id. at 232.
144 Id.
145 See id. at 234.
i4 Id.
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owners to another was not a "public use" and that the state therefore lacked the
power to use eminent domain.
47
The Supreme Court upheld the program as a valid public use after find-
ing that "[r]egulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic exer-
cise of a State's police powers.'' 48 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
noted that Berman was the "starting point" for an eminent domain analysis.
49
O'Connor then repeated the Berman Court's statement that "[o]nce the object is
within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of
eminent domain is clear ... [and that] the means of executing the project [also]
are for Congress and Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose has
been established."1 50 This is the same punting engine employed in Berman and
its consequences here are no different. Once the two questions of whether the
government's stated goal is a public use and whether the eminent domain is the
proper method of achieving this goal are ceded to the legislature, the Court has
few remaining grounds for overturning the taking. O'Connor acknowledges the
almost completely outcome-determinative effect of the punting engine through
her statement that "[t]here is, of course, a role for courts to play in reviewing a
legislature's judgment of what constitutes a public use, even when the eminent
domain power is equated with the police power. But... it is 'an extremely nar-
row' one."' 5' However, despite O'Connor's extensive reliance on Berman,
Midkiff evidences a somewhat different-though by no means novel-
formulation of the public use analysis. In Berman, the Supreme Court noted
that Congress' actions were designed to rectify the unsafe and unsanitary envi-
ronment of a "blighted area."152 Though the Berman Court did not go so far as
to hold that a run-down neighborhood was a common law nuisance, it is clear
that this problem falls within the ambit of Justice Marshall's "public health and
safety" formulation of the police power. This is significant because the Mugler-
era takings cases tended to use the shrinking engine and references to the police
power to uphold such actions, 53 whereas situations falling much farther to the
right on the state power continuum tended to require employment of the stretch-
ing engine and a greater number of references to public use.
The issue in Midkiff is far more difficult to categorize than those in
Berman, Mugler, Miln and Head. The Hawaii state legislature does not, and
could not, state that the landowners are using their property in any way that
harms the public. In fact, by leasing their land to others who could not afford to
purchase it outright, they arguably are conferring a benefit on the public. How-
147 Id. at 234-35.
148 Id. at 242.
149 Id. at 239.
150 Id. at 240 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)).
151 Id.
152 Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
153 See generally Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. 273 (1887).
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ever, this benefit is public only because so many people and properties are
bound up in the leasing arrangement. Unlike a property owner who, by building
a mill on his land that provides the benefit of needed agricultural processing for
the community, the decision of one landowner to lease his or her property to one
tenant has relatively limited effects. This not only obscures the line between
preventing harm and conferring a benefit, but the line between public and pri-
vate as well. A final level of confusion is revealed by observing that there is
nothing about the way the physical property is used that is problematic. The
public harm (or non-benefit) is solely a function of who holds title.
The multiple levels of analytical ambivalence presented by Midkiff frus-
trated principled application of a dichotomous (public use or police power) tak-
ings analysis because the Hawaii legislature did not propose a public use for the
condemned land nor did it stop any harmful uses. In all likelihood, the leased
land would be used in exactly the same way after condemnation as before.
Thus, neither focusing on the conduct of the landowner nor the proposed use by
the government can yield helpful clues about whether this is justified under the
police power or the Public Use Clause. This forces the conclusion that the Ha-
waii legislature's sole motivation for the use of eminent domain was to effect
the transfer of individual parcels of land from property owner A to lessee B for
no other reason than that it believed that society would be better off if B owned
the land than if A owned the land. This, on its face appears to contradict Justice
O'Connor's own statement that "one person's property may not be taken for the
benefit of another private person without a justifying public purpose, even
though compensation be paid.
154
To be fair, the transfers in Midkiff did not simply transfer property from
A to B, but from large groups of As to large groups of Bs. Thus, these private
takings became public through their volume, if not their character. Addition-
ally, there was a public purpose present in Midkiff. The thorny problem, how-
ever, is that the transfer was the purpose as well as the mechanism. This begs
the question of whether the fact of redistribution can justify its exercise when
there are economic benefits to the state. The fact that the Midkiff court did not
answer this question directly is unsettling. More unsettling, however, is the fact
that engaging in a public use analysis did not force the Court to confront this
issue.
In discussing the Court's engines of liberalization as applied in Berman,
this Article suggested that a traditional step in the takings analysis involved the
Court making a decision regarding whether to use the stretching or the shrinking
engine.1 55 This Article further noted that the choice necessarily was arbitrary
and ultimately would have little impact on the outcome of the case.156 However,
154 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (quoting Thompson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)).
155 See supra Part VII.B.2.
156 This is especially true because the principle of regulatory takings often dictates that even the
compensation question will have the same answer under a police power or public use rubric.
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this does not suggest that the Court explicitly must choose between the stretch-
ing or shrinking engines. Even under the logic of the supposedly coherent 19th
century takings cases, all three engines may be used in tandem.
As early as Miln, the Supreme Court stated that the state police power
encompassed the state's power "to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity
of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and every act of leg-
islation, which it may deem to be conducive to these ends .... 57 Once this
power merged with takings analysis post-Incorporation, the police power ex-
tended all the way to the right of the state power spectrum. Because the public
use "restraint" simultaneously had been expanded leftward towards non-public
use benefits, a large area of overlap between the two powers developed. 5 8 This
is precisely the confrontation that the Court faced in Mugler and is depicted in
Figure 2. However, this overlap only represented a confrontation because an
exercise of the police power did not require compensation whereas an exercise
of eminent domain for a public use did. 59 Even the defendants in Mugler con-
ceded the state's right to appropriate their property; they simply demanded
compensation.' 6 This compensation question was the only reason that the
Court needed to decide between the stretching and shrinking engines.
By the late 20th century, however, the question of compensation had
largely dropped out of takings inquiry. Once the Supreme Court addressed the
unfairness of allowing wholesale deprivations of property to go uncompensated
simply because it was premised on the police "power" by requiring compensa-
tion when the regulation went "too far," use of the police power no longer pre-
cluded compensation. In fact, in cases where the government action completely
deprived the landowner of his or her land's value, compensation was custom-
ary16' This simplified the analysis by mooting the arbitrary question of whether
a taking would be called an exercise of the police power or a public use. Under
one outcome, the government must provide compensation and, under the other,
the government probably also must compensate.
An extended discussion of the regulatory takings doctrine is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, two comments on its premise and consequences
do bear on the takings analysis of Miln. First, the idea that compensation could
be required where the "taking" was not for a public use, or where the govern-
ment's action operated to diminish the value of, rather than seize, the land,
represents a theoretically unjustified-if equitable-expansion of the Public Use
Clause.
157 Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 105 (1837).
158 See supra Parts IV and V for a discussion of this phenomenon.
159 See WiniuAM B. STOEBUCK AND DALE A. WHiTMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.4, at 524-26
(3d ed. 2000).
160 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 627, 8 S. Ct. 273, 274 (1887).
161 See STOEBUCK AND WHrrMAN, supra note 159, § 9.4, at 533-34 (noting that the diminution
in value must be "near complete" to warrant a finding that a taking has occurred).
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The public use and compensation requirements are contained in the
same clause of the Fifth Amendment and are part of the same broad restriction
on government takings. If the Public Use Clause is interpreted to have narrow
boundaries, there is no logical mandate for decoupling the compensation re-
quirement and extending its boundaries. The constitutional injunction "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation,"1 62 does not
indicate that "compensation" is any more important than "public use;" the two
requirements stand on equal footing. Thus, basing a rule of compensation on
whether the state asserts its police power-as opposed to a condemnation for
public use-to a degree that infringes on a property's value is an inherently
misguided constitutional disjunction.
Despite the theoretical problems associated with compensating land-
owners when the Supreme Court decides that shrinking, rather than stretching, is
the appropriate engine for upholding a government action, there is a great deal
of equity in awarding compensation. As previously stated, the decision whether
to shrink or to stretch is arbitrary and without practical consequence. Thus, im-
posing a narrow application of the compensation requirement in the name of
logical coherence when no such sacrifice is demanded of public use is palpably
unfair. Put bluntly, if the Court must mangle taking jurisprudence, the mangling
at least should be evenhanded. Viewed in this light, an incoherent public use
analysis mandates an incoherent "regulatory takings" doctrine.
The logic of regulatory takings bears direct relevance to the Midkiff de-
cision. Justice O'Connor's controversial assertion that "[t]he 'public use' re-
quirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers,' 63
is as theoretically unsound as it is an unfortunately accurate description of the
Court's jurisprudence. Since the end of the 19th century, any taking could be
upheld either through stretching the Public Use Clause or shrinking it to ac-
commodate a police power. However, once the monetary implications of this
decision are removed, there is no need to choose an engine. Either one works
equally well and, with the assistance of the punting engine, the choice can be
given to the legislature. This is illustrated below in Figure 3.
162 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
163 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
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Figure 3: Takings Analysis in Midkiff Compared with the MilniHead
Conception
Panel A
- Preventing a Public Harm - Creating a Public Benefit
Takings Law After Miln & Head
I No Compensation Required I Compensation May Be Required I
Panel B Takings Law After Berman & Midkiff
Comp
Not Req.
Preventing Rec-
ognized Nui-
sances
Compensation May Be Required
State Power Continuum
Exclusive Police Power
No Compensation Required
Public Use & Police Power Overlap
Compensation May Be Required
Panel A represents the state of takings law after Miln and Head. It is
identical to the diagram appearing in Figure 2. Panel B represents the concep-
tion of takings law that existed after Berman and Midkiff Under the Miln/Head
model, the state's police power had already swallowed Public Use completely
because anything that was in a state's power was unhelpfully labeled "police
power." The public use line of jurisprudence had liberalized to a significant
extent by this point. However, as much as "public use" had become "public
benefit," neither Miln nor Mugler extended this into the arena of "harm preven-
tion."
This Article argued that, prior to Incorporation, the Public Use Clause
contained an implicit logical tension. Because federal powers were, and still
are, not plenary, reading the Public Use Clause as an affirmative grant of power
enabled it to condemn land for purposes not clearly in furtherance of an enu-
merated power. Broadening public use thus allowed the government to engage
in takings that it otherwise could not. This provided an incentive for the federal
government to urge a broad interpretation of this clause. The more broadly pub-
lic use was construed, the more the government could do if it paid compensa-
Comp.
Req.
t
Takings for
Clear Pub-
lic Uses
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tion. Though the compensation requirement would deter a government from
labeling its taking as a public use, this price at least buys additional power.
Because the Supreme Court had articulated broad police powers for
states, the natural temptation of the state would be to label an action an exercise
of the police power whenever possible and avoid the requirement of compensa-
tion. This is most apparent in Mugler, where the State of Kansas urged the
United States Supreme Court to find that the taking "must be governed by prin-
ciples that do not involve the power of eminent domain."' 64 No state would
want to pay to exercise power that it could use for free. To the extent that the
Mugler Court was sympathetic to Kansas' prohibition goal, it is understandable
that the Court would employ shrinking instead of stretching. Based on these
considerations, this Article speculates that few state attorneys assigned to tak-
ings cases would advocate for a construction of Public Use that superimposed a
compensation requirement upon pre-existing power.
Panel B of Figure 3 graphically represents Justice O'Connor's statement
that "[t]he 'public use' requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sov-
ereign's police powers.' 65 It is absurd to think that a government restraint
could cover the same area as a grant of power, at least in theory. The definition
of a restraint entails the containment, not the broadening of power. However, as
absurd as this statement may be from a theoretical perspective, post-Mugler, a
state could accomplish anything permissible under the Public Use Clause by
using the shrinking engine to invoke the police power instead. However, this
does not mean that the two 'powers' were coterminous. No recorded case exists
from the 19th century in which a state asked the Court to find a compensable
taking where authority under the police power was clear.1 66 Thus, while it is fair
to say that the police power, post-Mugler, extended all the way to the left of the
power continuum, the Public Use Clause probably did not extend nearly as far
leftward.
The language of Berman marked a slight departure from earlier takings
theory even though it achieved the same practical results. In Berman, the Court
found a public use, apparently because it agreed with the state's contention that
the action was justified under the state's police power. 167 This seemingly oxy-
moronic holding had no practical effect on takings law because compensation
had become possible at every point of the state power continuum when govern-
ment action went "too far" in diminishing the interest of the landowner.
168
Though the "character of the governmental action" prong of the regulatory tak-
ings test probably meant that the likelihood of a compensation award increased
164 See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 623, 8 S. Ct. at 278.
165 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240; see supra p. 747-49 and Panel B of Figure 3.
166 Such as a case where the state was abating a common law nuisance.
167 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
168 See discussion of Berman supra Part VII.B. 1.
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significantly toward the right end of the continuum 69 and decreased as the ac-
tion approached the left, the disappearance of a bright line practical distinction
in the outcomes achieved by stretching or shrinking, eliminated the need to state
which of the first two engines the courts had employed before punting. Because
the practical differences between application of the police power or that Public
Use Clause to any given case had so greatly eroded, Justice O'Connor's state-
ment that the public use requirement is coterminous with the state's police
power becomes true for all practical purposes.
Based on these observations, Midkiff does not represent any more of a
departure from well-established takings law than did Berman. The practical
consequences for compensation that stretching or shrinking entailed at the time
of Mugler, were largely erased by the late 20th century due to the emergence of
the regulatory takings doctrine. This, however, simply meant that the Court no
longer needed to make an arbitrary choice in applying takings analysis, and the
landowner no longer would be deprived of compensation based on the Court's
choice. Takings jurisprudence may have been just as convoluted after Midkiff as
it was after Mugler. However, to the extent that the Midkiff Court's analysis
was not more arbitrary or unviable than Mugler' s, and to the extent that a prop-
erty owner could obtain compensation in more situations in 1984 than he or she
could in 1886, there is no basis for concluding that takings analysis had "dete-
riorated" in any new or meaningful way between Mugler and Kelo. The only
new developments were an increased level of candor regarding the state of tak-
ings analysis and a greater possibility that a government action could require
compensating the landowner.
3. Kelo
This Article began with the propositions that Kelo did not diminish the
rights of private property owners or further erode the coherence of takings juris-
prudence in any novel or meaningful way. Previous sections demonstrated how
the pre-Incorporation era Supreme Court interpreted police power and public
use broadly and without reference to each other, resulting in an unviable post-
Incorporation takings rubric. The analytical takings framework of the late 19th
century remained largely in place through the course of the 20th century and, to
the extent that any theoretical deterioration had occurred, it had not further di-
minished property rights. The only remaining question regarding the Supreme
Court's historical application of the public use/police power analysis is whether
Kelo increased the incoherence of takings analysis in any way that the preceding
century of case law had not.
In Kelo, the City of New London created a corporation called the New
London Development Corporation (NLDC) for the purposes of implementing
169 The right end of the continuum is the area where state actions most clearly resemble physi-
cal takings for actual public uses. See Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978).
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the city's plans to revitalize its severely slumping economy. 7 ° As part of this
effort, the NLDC developed a plan to condemn multiple tracts of private resi-
dential property bordering a local park for the purpose of tearing down the exist-
ing homes and building an upscale "urban village" containing office space, res-
taurants, stores and new homes.' 7' This development was expressly intended to
capitalize on the Pfizer Pharmaceuticals Company's decision to build a large
facility on adjacent land. 72 To this end, the "urban village" was designed to
provide attractive spending opportunities to the large influx of Pfizer employees
and, thereby, generate needed revenue for the City.1
73
Several homeowners whose land was condemned for the proposed de-
velopment complained that the takings were not for a public use because their
homes were not blighted and also because the condemnations were expressly
intended to benefit the employees of a single private corporation.174
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the takings after noting that the "dispo-
sition of this case... turns on the question whether the City's development plan
serves a 'public purpose' ' 175 and that the category of public purposes is "broad
and inclusive."'' 76  Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens stated
that
[t]wo polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it
has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the
property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another
private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On
the other hand, it is equally clear that a State may transfer prop-
erty from one private party to another if future "use by the pub-
lic" is the purpose of the taking.
177
Justice Stevens then noted that the Supreme Court "long ago rejected
any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the
general public"' 78 and that "[p]romoting economic development is a tradi-
tional and long accepted function of government.' ' 179 After articulating these
propositions, Stevens then quoted Berman and Midkiffs holdings that the gov-
170 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
171 Id. at 474-45.
172 Id. at 473-74.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 475.
175 Id. at 480.
176 Id. at 481.
177 Id. at 447.
178 Id. at 479 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).
179 Id. at 484.
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ernment's judgments regarding both the public interest and the means of attain-
ing that interest were entitled to great deference.
80
Before disposing of the case, Stevens specifically addressed Kelo's two
arguments that the stated purpose of providing an attractive community for
Pfizer employees violated the Public Use Clause and that there should be a per
se rule against takings for the sole purpose of "economic development." To
counter the first argument, Stevens observed that "the government's pursuit of a
public purpose will often benefit individual private parties. For example, in
Midkiff, the forced transfer of property conferred a direct and significant benefit
on those lessees who were previously unable to purchase their homes."' 18 1 In
response to the second argument, Stevens opined that there was "no principled
way of distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes
that we have recognized."'' 82 Based on these rationales, Stevens found such
takings to be valid public uses.
At first blush, the Kelo opinion appears rather unexceptional. The Court
employed the stretching engine to include economic development within the
ambit of the Public Use Clause and then the punting engine to avoid determin-
ing whether the use truly was public or reasonably suited to achieve its purpose.
None of this is particularly new and none of Stevens's remarks contain any
novel attack on a landowner's rights in private property. In fact, the Court's
emphasis on the fact that condemnation plan was "comprehensive" and pre-
ceded by "thorough deliberation" could be read to suggest that the Kelo Court
demanded more from the government before it would uphold a taking than did
the Berman and Midkiff Courts. 183
The fact that Kelo employed the same engines of liberalization in much
the same way that they have always been used raises the question of why the
dissent so vigorously opposed what, essentially, was "more of the same." This
question is all the more perplexing considering that Justice O'Connor wrote
both a lengthy dissent in Kelo and the majority opinion in Midkiff.
In her Kelo dissent, O'Connor argued that the "Government may com-
pel an individual to forfeit her property for the public's use, but not for the bene-
fit of another private person."'184 However, she previously had found in Midkiff
180 Id. at 488-89.
181 Id. at 485.
182 Id. at 484.
183 Id. The condemnation plans both in Berman and Midkiff were every bit as systematic as that
employed by the City of New London in Kelo. Significantly, however, the Midkiff Court did not
use this fact to support its decision. The Berman Court did mention the systematic nature of the
program, but only in the context of holding that one property owner's different circumstances did
not justify departure from a general plan. Thus, neither of these cases emphasize the fact that
property owners were afforded some measure of process, as Kelo does. This new emphasis could
be read to suggest that the Supreme Court might require an increased level of due process protec-
tion for landowners who face condemnation.
184 Id. at 497 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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that the systematic transfer of land from wealthy landowners to their poor ten-
ants was an acceptable public use even though no one except the tenants who
previously lived on the land would use it afterwards.' 85 In justifying the earlier
Midkiff takings, O'Connor noted that the concentration of land "skew[ed]
the... fee simple market."' 86 The proposed solution entailed granting the direct
benefit of land ownership to the individual tenants in the hope that, if done on a
large scale, this would normalize the market. 87  The public good achieved
through these measures can only be described as indirect. This simply does not
accord with O'Connor's objection in Kelo that "if predicted (or even guaran-
teed) positive side effects are enough to render transfer from one private party to
another [a word is missing here. Perhaps "Constitutional"?]. . . , then the words
'for public use' do not realistically exclude any taking .... ,88 O'Connor, of
course, is right that the words "for public use" are a rather meaningless restraint.
However, she was the same justice who opined that "the 'public use' require-
ment is ... coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers.' 89 Why
the change of heart?
O'Connor attempts to distinguish Midkiff by stating that "[in Midkiffj,
the relevant legislative body had found that eliminating the existing property use
was necessary to remedy the harm."' 190 However, O'Connor's statement of the
facts is simply wrong. In Midkiff, the problem at issue had nothing to do with
how the land was used; the problems inured solely in the fact of ownership.
There was no expectation that the former lessees would use their land in any
new way that would increase tax revenue or that their land would itself be avail-
able to the public. Indeed, Hawaii's proposed solution, if it worked perfectly,
would have resulted in the same people using the land in exactly the same way
as they had before.' 9' O'Connor's claim that the public benefit in Kelo-where
the city at least proposed lucrative new uses for the land-is any more of an
indirect benefit than that in Midkiff, thus, is laughable.
That O'Connor is wrong in her belief that Kelo can be legally distin-
guished from Midkiff does not diminish the fact that there is something about the
latter case that bothered her, which was absent in the former. 192 If the indirect-
ness of the benefit is not the cause, perhaps it is the fact that a single corporation
stands to gain from the transaction in Kelo, whereas in Midkiff, thousands of
individual tenants would gain. It also is possible that O'Connor simply thought
185 See generally Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
186 See id. at 232.
187 See generally id.
188 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
189 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
190 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
191 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241-42.
192 It is possible that this is explained by O'Connor's views having changed in the 20 years
between Midkiffand Kelo, but such a proposition could only be speculative.
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that correcting the evils of "oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth"'193 was a
more compelling governmental objective than combating a severely slumping
local economy. However, if the direct beneficiary is only the mechanism for
effectuating the ultimate public use, then the fact that there is one mechanism or
ten thousand should not be relevant to the question of whether the ultimate
benefit is public. Similarly, if the Supreme Court punts the identification of
both the public purpose and the means to best effectuate it to the legislature, it
would make little sense for the Court to then weigh the importance of one iden-
tified public purpose with another. The fact that O'Connor's is unable to clearly
Prticulate her objections to Kelo using the public use/police power rubric dem-
onstrates the incoherence of the Supreme Court's takings analysis with as much
force as the Kelo holding itself.
VIII. "SMALLER PEGS AND HOLES": THE PRACTICALITY AND COHERENCE OF
CONSERVATIVE APPROACHES TO TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
As previously demonstrated, principled takings analysis cannot proceed
unless a court first makes an arbitrary, and often meaningless, decision regard-
ing where to draw the line between public use and the police power. The inco-
herent and arbitrary nature of this analysis breeds judicial frustration and en-
courages increased use of the punting engine.
The fact that labeling a taking as an exercise of the police power or a
public use is no longer determinative of the compensation issue-and has long
been irrelevant to the government's ability to appropriate-may explain why the
punting engine has become the most visible of the three engines of liberalization
in the 20th century cases. In fact, neither the Kelo majority nor concurring opin-
ions mentions the words "police power" even once!194 However, as exasperat-
ing as critics may find the Supreme Court's reflexive deference to legislative
determinations, the punting engine does not frustrate judicial review; it merely
saves courts from confronting the impossibility of such review.
The forgoing analysis forcefully suggests that the Supreme Court's tak-
ings rubric had become unworkable under it own terms. However, this leaves
open the question of whether this rubric is unviable on all terms or whether clar-
ity can be restored by narrowing the concepts of the police power and Public
Use Clause to more conservative and literalist meanings. The answer to this
question requires examination of the arguments of two of the most prominent
conservative critics of the prevailing rubric, Justice Thomas and Professor Ep-
stein.
193 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
194 See generally Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469-93. The first time that the police power is mentioned is
in Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion. Id. at 501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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A. The High Price of Coherence: The Literalist Approach of Justice Cla-
rence Thomas
In his Kelo dissent, Justice Thomas argues that it is "imperative that the
Court maintain absolute fidelity" to the Public Use Clause.195 According to
Thomas, such fidelity requires that the clause be read literally to prohibit the
government from taking property except "for public use."
196
Thomas's approach is very alluring for several reasons. First, the fact
that the Public Use Clause would simply duplicate the Necessary and Proper
Clause if the term "public use" did not have a fixed and narrow meaning mili-
tates in favor of interpreting the clause fairly literally to give it an independent
effect under established canons of construction. 197 Second, Thomas persua-
sively argues that "the phrase 'public use' contrasts with the very different
phrase 'general Welfare' used elsewhere in the Constitution."' 198 This demon-
strates that the framers of the Bill of Rights knew how to suggest a broader
meaning and chose not to do so in the Public Use Clause. Interpreting public
use literally is the only method of giving effect to this textual distinction.
A third advantage of the literalist approach is its ease of application.
Though there is some room for ambiguity on issues such as what percentage of
the public must have access and whether a charge may be imposed,' 99 determin-
ing whether the condemnation is for an actual public use usually should be as
straightforward as deciding whether the construction plans call for a public road
or a private mansion.
Fourth and most importantly, the literalist approach appears, at least on
its face, to offer the promise of greater protections for private property owners
against government takings because the reasons for a taking are so limited.
The apparent theoretical simplicity and practical advantages of a literal-
ist interpretation are strong incentives, especially given the present incoherence
of the broader takings analysis. However, the initial appeal of this approach
disguises numerous fatal flaws.
Restricting government takings to those situations where a public use
can be demonstrated necessarily mandates that, where the government cannot
prove such a direct public use, no taking will be allowed. However, even the
earliest Supreme Court cases demonstrate that there are many situations in
which the government would have a need to employ eminent domain for non-
195 Id. at 507. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 28
(2005)).
196 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
197 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
198 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 509 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also Nathan Alexander Sales, Classical
Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment's "Public Use" Requirement, 49 DUKE L.J. 339, 368
(2000).
199 See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 21, at 162-66.
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public uses that most people would acknowledge as reasonable and necessary.
One such example appears in the Beasley opinion discussed in Part 1H. There
the Supreme Court noted that "[i]t would be a poor consolation to the people of
this town to give them the power of going in and out of the town upon a rail-
road, while they were refused the means of grinding their wheat.' '20 Unless the
government is willing to forgo using the power of eminent domain to develop
needed agricultural or industrial services where these operations are run by pri-
vate businesses or not necessarily open for general public use, °1 strict adher-
ence to a "use by the public" test exalts form over function.
Mills and other service providers are borderline examples because they
could fall within the "common carrier" rubric of public use. However, an
even clearer example can be found in government condemnations of land for
military bases. Few people would argue that a government should not take nec-
essary steps to defend its citizens. Viewed from a layman's perspective, the
government's power-if not its duty-to use the eminent domain powers for
such purposes appears beyond obvious. However, applying the literalist inter-
pretation of public use would invalidate such a taking unless these bases com-
promised their security by allowing general public use and access.
Justice Thomas attempts to circumvent the ramifications of a strict pub-
lic use test even as he advocates its adoption. In analyzing the Supreme Court's
adoption of a public purpose test in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley,20 3
Thomas goes to great lengths to find an actual public use to justify the construc-
tion of an irrigation ditch.20 4 Thomas eventually concludes that a public use was
present because a statute provided that citizens who "owned lands irrigated by
the ditch-had a right to use it. '20 5 Thomas's logic here is flimsy because, in his
own words, only those landowners adjacent to the ditch had the right to use it.
This does not allow use by the general public unless "general public" is defined
to include only those people who own land that happens to be adjacent to the
ditch. If a ditch is constructed in an area with large farms, this "general public"
may include only six or seven landowners.
Thomas makes a second, even more suspect, effort to soften the rigidity
of his literalist approach by stating that lands "owned by the government" are
200 See Burlington v. Beasley, 94 U.S. 310, 313-14 (1876).
201 Not every such mill may allow members of the general public to use the facilities them-
selves. However, where the citizens of a town depend upon the finished product in their daily
lives, there is good reason to deprive the local government of eminent domain powers because
they have contracted with private business to operate the facility. This is much like the logic used
for common carriers, which often may push the logic of public "use" despite the fact that they
serve a compelling public need.
202 See generally Common Carriers, MARYLAND CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 4TH
EDITION (The Maryland Institute for Continuing Professional Education of Lawyers, Inc., 2004).
203 164 U.S. 112(1896).
204 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 515 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
205 Id.
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"public uses" ipsofacto.2°6 Concededly, this assertion finds support in Supreme
Court precedent. 207 Nonetheless it is logically unsupportable. A strict public
use test allows courts to ascertain the beneficiaries of the exercise of eminent
domain by examining whether the public actually uses the land. Inquiry into
who holds title to the land is relevant only to the extent that it is probative of the
ultimate issue of use. Actual use must remain the touchstone of a literalist pub-
lic use test for one very practical reason. Namely, if government retention of
title to the land conclusively determined the question of public use, then the
Public Use Clause could be circumvented by a local government retaining title
to the land, while granting the benefits of its use to a private party. This possi-
bility may appear laughable at first glance, however, the fact that the Public Use
Clause was a restriction on the ability of government to appropriate land, sug-
gests that the possibility of government misuse of the power was of great con-
cern to the framers of the Bill of Rights.
Without employing artifices such as a "public ownership" exception, a
court is left with only two possibilities in all situations where the government
desires to acquire land for a public need beyond actual use. The first option is to
preclude the government from acquiring the land, and force it to navigate such
market forces as hold-outs and other opportunistic property owners. This would
make the provision of many needed public benefits so expensive that the gov-
ernment often would not be able to provide them to citizens. Because this ap-
proach has such great potential to cripple many government efforts or force
them to impose higher taxes on citizens, courts are unlikely to adopt this ap-
proach.
The second option that courts have is to allow the government to ac-
quire the land through some other power. Given the Supreme Court's expansive
interpretation of the police power over the past one and a half centuries and the
practical needs of society, it is overwhelmingly likely that the Supreme Court
would adopt this approach. Because the requirements of the Public Use Clause
could not be applied in such situations, courts would have no logical basis for
mandating government compensation of landowners when a regulation or other
government action that is not a public use "goes too far" and destroys the value
of property. This would leave property owners with even less protection than
they enjoy under the current system of jurisprudence.
These observations demonstrate that even those critics who advocate a
strict public use requirement demand more from the takings analysis than its
terms defensibly can provide. Unless conservatives are willing to allow numer-
ous exceptions to the strict public use test, such a conception of the Public Use
Clause is overwhelmingly likely to hurt the interests of both society and indi-
vidual landowners. To the extent that these exceptions are allowed, however,
the literalist approach loses much of its initial attractiveness.
206 Id. at 517.
207 See, e.g., United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
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B. "Square Pegs, Round Holes, and a Few Rolls of Duct Tape ": Reading
Coherence Back into Takings Jurisprudence through Epstein's
Theories
Professor Epstein comprehensively examines the Public Use Clause and
police power through the lens of John Locke's theories on the relationship be-
tween individuals, private property and the state in his book, Takings: Private
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain ("Takings").2 °8 It is beyond the
scope of this Article to critique Epstein's use of Lockean Theory or to provide a
general exegesis of his work on the broad subject of eminent domain jurispru-
dence. Instead, this section focuses on his interpretations of public use and the
police power to determine whether his formulations of these concepts offer a
better alternative to those developed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
1. The Police Power, Crime, and Anti-Nuisance
Epstein argues that "[a]ny adequate account of the ends served by the
police power limitation should be congruent with the language and aims of the
takings clause" 209 and that neither the Lochner Court's articulation of the police
power as containing "[t]hose powers ... [that] relate to the safety, health, mor-
als, and general welfare of the public"210 nor the modem view of the police
power as all state power are conceptually viable.2 ' Specifically, Epstein states
that "[b]oth the traditional and the modem formulations go beyond the original
Lockean conception and are too broad to be defended in analytical terms. The
legitimate state interest test in vogue today is a bare conclusion, tantamount to
asserting that the action is legitimate because it is lawful. '212 This assertion is
consistent with the analyses of the Supreme Court's application of the police
power in the preceding sections of this Article. Epstein also is correct to ob-
serve that the incoherence of the police power is "the entering wedge to allow,
encourage, and indeed ustify judges to reach whatever result they prefer on any
given state of affairs."' 13 The Supreme Court's ability to set the boundaries of
the police power at different points in individual cases is very much related to
the shrinking engine postulated by this Article. However, the shrinking engine
does not allow judges to reach "whatever result they prefer," as Epstein
claims.1 4
208 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 2 1.
209 Id. at 108.
210 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
211 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 21, at 109.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 116.
214 Id.
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Because the Supreme Court has refused to find a gap between the police
power and the Public Use Clause on the state power continuum, shrinking can
only function as an engine of liberalization, allowing the state to exercise
more-never less-power. A narrow reading of the police power necessarily
results in an expansive reading of the Public Use Clause. Thus, judges can jus-
tify "whatever result they prefer" only so long as they prefer to find the taking
valid.215
Epstein follows his criticisms of the modem Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the police power by articulating a narrower variant of this principle:
The relationship between public use and the police power is
well captured in an analogy drawn from private law-the dis-
tinction between self-defense and private necessity. Self-
defense allows one to inflict harm without compensating the
person harmed, while private necessity creates only a condi-
tional privilege, which allows the harm to be inflicted but only
upon payment .... [T]he police power gives the state control
over the full catalogue of common law wrongs . . . involving
force and misrepresentation, deliberate or accidental, against
other persons, including private nuisances.
216
This conceptualization of the police power has several attractive features. First,
the analogy to private law fits well within the Lockean position that a govern-
ment obtains the rights those individuals formerly possesses in a state of na-
ture.217 Consonance with a particular philosopher's social theory, of course, is
not the touchstone of its constitutionality. Nonetheless, the fact that Epstein's
police power can be explained according to any theory is an advantage over the
Supreme Court's present jurisprudence. Second, the boundaries of Epstein's
police power are far easier to define and apply in practice. Where the govern-
ment prevents wrongful conduct, it need not compensate. Where the conduct is
not wrongful, compensation must be paid. A third advantage is that Epstein's
police power comports with a very basic sense of equity. A property owner
does not have a right to commit wrongful acts. Thus, disrupting those acts
should not require compensation. In contrast, a property owner does have a
215 See supra Part VI. However, Epstein is correct to a certain extent because a judge can affect
the outcome of the compensation question by manipulating the boundaries of the police power, as
was done in Mugler.
216 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 21, at 109-11.
217 Including the natural right of self defense and the right to preserve oneself through other-
wise illegal means when it is necessary to prevent death or grave injury. An additional power in
this group is the right to exact punishment when others commit wrongs. The idea is that, when
people leave the state of nature and enter into society, they delegate much of their natural right to
harm another who has previously committed a wrong against them. This becomes the job of the
police. Because of this logic, Epstein's conception of the police power has great intellectual ap-
peal and this Article's later articulation of a police power builds on Epstein's logic.
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right to engage in lawful acts and, thus, loses something when those acts are
stopped. However, these attractive features of Epstein's police power disguise
several conceptual and practical deficiencies.
The first problem with Epstein's police power is the difficulty of defin-
ing a "wrong." As Epstein defines the term, it encompasses crimes and torts
involving "force or fraud" as well as common law nuisances.1 8 In the first in-
stance, the question of what constitutes a "nuisance" is not altogether clear.
Epstein comments on this problem by reference to the difficult case of Miller v.
Shoene, which stands at the periphery of nuisance law. 219 After stating his posi-
tion on the case in qualified language, Epstein notes that "[tihe intellectual diffi-
culty of these narrow points conceals their institutional importance. Some un-
certainty must be tolerated at the edges; sound social institutions will never
stand or fall on the marginal classification issues that test every legal doc-
trine., 220 A coherent takings analysis need not account for every possible set of
facts that can develop in society. However, it must be able to account for the
most common scenarios. Miller falls within the not-uncommon category of
situations where one person's use of land harms others but is not wrongful in
and of itself. If there is "uncertainty at the edges" of nuisance law then this may
not be the best place to draw a bright line between the police power and takings
for public use.
Epstein's unexplained inclusion of crimes involving "force or fraud"
within the police power exacerbates the uncertainty of his police power. No
answer is given to the question, "What wrongs involve force or fraud and how
does one use their property to commit them?" Assuming that a list of crimes
and torts involving force or fraud can be developed, the next question is "Can
this list change over time?" The question is important because if Epstein desires
to freeze the list of wrongs that can trigger a police power response in time, then
this area of law no longer will be able to change in response to new situations.
However, if Epstein's police power allows the law to change-as it must-then
there must be a system for determining what new crimes or wrongs would be
included. Such a system invites at least as much legislative mischief and ad hoc
review as it avoids. 22' To the extent that the police power has narrow bounda-
218 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 21, at 112.
219 276 U.S. 272 (1928). In Miller, a fungus that lived on the cedar trees of one person's land
was destroying the apple trees on neighboring land. This fungus could not harm people, animals
or most other types of trees. However, apple trees were an important local crop and the value of
the apple trees was much greater than the cedars. Based on these facts, the Supreme Court upheld
the state's destruction of the cedars without compensation. Epstein argues that there was nothing
wrongful about owning the cedars and the fact that the apple trees were worth more should not
defeat the cedar owner's property rights.
220 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 2 1, at 114.
221 Legislatures easily could craft statutes that define non-compliance with a particular zoning
ordinance as deceit or require property owners to make representations that their land is compli-
ant. Even where this is not done, courts still would be forced to decide which new "wrongs" are
nuisances without the assistance of a clear limiting principle.
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ries on the other side of which lies the compensation requirement, these bounda-
ries must not be "uncertain."
A second problem with Epstein's formulation of the police power is its
underinclusiveness. Epstein's limitation of the police power's bounds to nui-
sances, force and fraud leaves many important areas unaddressed. The most
obvious of these are crimes that do not involve force or fraud. It is doubtful that
Epstein seriously advocates that the state compensate landowners before closing
down brothels, as the Mugler Court chided.222 However, operating a brothel,
though criminal in most jurisdictions, involves neither force nor fraud. Ep-
stein's strict "physical invasion" test requires the harm from one landowner's
property to cross the property line-such as when smoke, pollutions or noxious
odors invade neighbors' properties-before the harm can be declared a nui-
sance. 223 Does a quietly-operated brothel meet this test? If not, would the aver-
age person deem it any less a nuisance if it was located next to his or her home?
The underinclusiveness of Epstein's police power has implications be-
yond the exclusion of crime. Epstein further finds the police power inapplicable
22425to legislation for the purposes of rent control, wetlands protection,225 flood
control,22 6 and regulation of strip mining 227 unless some "wrong" is committed.
If the government desires to legislate on these subjects, Epstein's analysis would
require compensation for all property owners who lost value as a result.228 This
certainly provides a high degree of protection for private property owners.
However, the facility with which the borders of the police power can be crossed
means that many types of legislation would become fantastically costly. Thus,
as attractive as Epstein's police power may appear to defenders of private prop-
erty, it raises serious questions as to whether society would be prepared to pay
the costs of these rights and whether courts would be willing to honor them con-
sistently over time.
2. The Public Use Clause and "Public Goods"
Epstein links the issue of the Public Use Clause's proper scope with a
modified Lockean Theory. Stated very briefly, an organized society can pro-
duce wealth more efficiently than an equal number of individuals in a state of
nature. 229 The difference between the amount of wealth that a given number of
individuals could accumulate in a state of nature and the amount of wealth that
222 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. 273, 283 (1887).
223 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 21, at 117-18.
224 Id. at 176-77.
225 Id. at 121-23.
226 Id. at 123-24.
227 Id. at 124-25.
228 Id. at 121-25.
229 Id. at 162.
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the same number of individuals could accumulate in society is the "surplus. 230
Epstein's conception of Lockean Theory demands that the government of the
society return all surplus-minus that needed to operate the government-to the
individual members of the society on a pro rata basis. 231 According to Epstein,
one of the fundamental purposes of the Public Use Clause is to ensure that the
government does not use its eminent domain power to grant disproportionate
surplus to influential individuals or groups.232
This surplus theory is outlined above because it informs Epstein's con-
ception of the Public Use Clause to such a high degree. However, this section
argues that Epstein's emphasis on interpreting the Public Use Clause to fit
within Lockean Theory-as opposed to within the text of the Constitution-is a
significant analytical shortcoming.
Epstein asserts that there are three categories of permissible public use.
The first is rooted in the economic theory of "public goods" and includes gov-
ernment services such as national defense. A public good requires two ele-
ments: (1) non-exclusivity and (2) minimal costs associated with increasing the
number of beneficiaries. 233 National defense is non-exclusive because "the act
of providing protection for one citizen also provides it for his neighbor., 234 A
citizen cannot practically refuse the benefit of this service. Similarly, the mar-
ginal costs of providing this service to 100 citizens is not proportionally lower
than the cost of providing it for 10,000 citizens. 235 Thus, government condem-
nations for the purpose of building military bases, lighthouses and other general-
ized public services satisfy the Public Use Clause under the same logic as na-
tional defense.
Epstein's second category of public uses includes services such as parks
and highways, which individual citizens can refuse to use. Epstein notes that
these services do have proportionally increasing marginal costs and that they are
public "only because the government chooses to provide them., 236 Nonetheless,
he concludes that the eminent domain power "surely [can] be used to acquire
land.., for these purposes. 237
Epstein's labels the final category of valid public uses "private takings
for public use." 238 These takings encompass the controversial "indirect bene-
230 Id. at 162-63.
231 Id. at 163. The basis actually is pro rata according to the individual's private holdings. It is
not an equal distribution to all citizens.
232 Id. at 163-64.
233 Id. at 166. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
234 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 21, at 166.
235 See id.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 167.
238 Id. at 169.
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fits" at issue in Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo where eminent domain is used to
transfer property from one private citizen to another under the theory that the
second citizen will use the property to provide a public benefit that the first citi-
zen could not.239 For a taking in this category to be valid, Epstein asserts that
two conditions must be met. First, there must be a "bilateral monopoly born of
necessity." 24° Second, "some effort must be made to divide the surplus between
the [transferring and acquiring parties]." 24'
Epstein asserts that the Supreme Court's early Mill Act Cases are ex-
plainable under the bilateral monopoly/surplus division framework. A bilateral
monopoly exists where "there is only one buyer and one seller, resulting in
transactional delays because each party can hold out for a better deal without
fearing that the other party will turn [elsewhere]. 242 Epstein claims that this
situation was in play with Mill Act Cases because damming a river for the mill
always would cause upstream land to flood.243 The owner of the mill had no
ability to choose between different parcels of land and, if the owner(s) of the
upstream parcels refused to sell their land-perhaps in hopes of driving up the
price-then the mill could not be built.244 Because mills were essential to local
industry, the public would benefit if the government used eminent domain. Fur-
ther, because the mill owner was constrained by the bilateral monopoly, there is
less danger that he or she is using the government to "assert his will and domin-
ion over the property of another,, 245 or so Epstein's argument runs.
After identifying the existence of a bilateral monopoly in the Mill Act
Cases, Epstein next notes that many of the states were required to pay 150% of
the property's value before they could condemn it.246 Epstein reasons that, in
such a situation, the owner of the mill and the owner of the property to be con-
demned became "the public" and each obtained a "pro rata share of the gain, to
the extent that ordinary institutions can provide it."'247 Thus, Epstein reasons
that the surplus is evenly divided among the public, satisfying his second crite-
rion.248
239 Id. at 169-80 (discussing what circumstances must be present for one of these takings to be
valid).
240 Id. at 181.
241 Id. Epstein propounds this general rule within the specific context of rent control statutes.
This Article, therefore, distills his specific statement that the surplus must be divided between the
"landlord and the tenant" into the underlying economic proposition on which it is based.
242 BLACK'S, supra note 80, at 1028.
243 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 21, at 170-73.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 See id. at 174 (discussing the "pivotal role of the surplus" and referencing the New Hamp-
shire Mill Act); see also Burlington v. Beasley, 94 U.S. 310 (1876).
247 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 21, at 174.
248 Id.
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There are many grounds for contesting the application of Epstein's bi-
lateral monopoly/division of surplus theory to the Mill Act Cases on a theoreti-
cal level. However, because this section is concerned with the broader and more
fundamental problems associated with Epstein's hypothesis, it is only appropri-
ate here to point out the two most obvious problems.
First, "born of necessity" is a slippery concept that begs the question,
"Whose necessity governs?" The mill may be beneficial for the local commu-
nity but this does not mean it is necessary. Indeed, because so few improve-
ments are necessary for the continued survival of a community, public necessity
would be an unreasonably restrictive requirement for takings. It also would
place non-elected judges in the position of deciding whether a taking that the
entire population and their elected government finds important rises to the
heights of necessity. If "born of necessity" means only that the mill owner must
use the particular parcel of condemned land, then necessity is satisfied any time
a person proposes a project that requires using his neighbor's land. Such a safe-
guard on property not only is easily bypassed, it is fundamentally misdirected,
focusing on the needs of the mill owner as opposed to the needs of society.
249
The second problem inuring in Epstein's hypothesis is that the 150%
price actually divides the surplus equitably between the two parties. This sim-
ply is not realistic. There is no method of adequately valuating the surplus
wealth that the mill will generate at the time of condemnation. Even Epstein
acknowledges that "one should not demand perfect precision because there is no
way to provide it."' 250 However, this "uncertainty at the edges" argument dis-
guises two important facts: (1) there is no method of even roughly approximat-
ing the amount of surplus that a long-term project will bring, and (2) division of
the surplus is not a fair method of valuating compensation-it has nothing to do
with public use-because it encourages the owners of worthless land to hold out
for condemnation whenever they think that the project will generate the surplus.
Such heavy-handed protection of private property utterly divorces the compen-
sation question from the land's subjective or market value.
Notwithstanding the "uncertainty at the edges" of Epstein's categories
of valid public uses, they are fairly good descriptions of many of the Supreme
Court's holdings. An analysis of Epstein's application of the bilateral monop-
oly/division of surplus rubric to the Mill Act Cases reveals that the rubric not
249 A third problem with the "born of necessity" argument arises in a situation where a project
could be completed on any one of three parcels of land but no others. Does the necessity rule
mean that it must be necessary to condemn a particular plot of land or can it be satisfied if some-
body's land must be condemned but, within limits, it does not matter whose? If the former of
these interpretations is accepted, then it would be impossible to find necessity except in those
limited situations where only one property could be used effectively. Requiring the government
to prove this has the potential to generate prohibitively long and expensive discovery processes.
If the latter interpretation is employed, then "born of necessity" becomes an almost laughably easy
test affording few protections for property owners.
250 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 21, at 175.
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only fits, it is tailor-made. However, therein lies the most fundamental problem
with Epstein's categories of public use.
One of the great dangers in superimposing a new theoretical framework
on past cases is that the theory can fit the facts perfectly while utterly failing to
capture the underlying forces that caused the case to be decided as it was. Any
number of theories, from "bilateral monopolies" to a special exception for mills
can be crafted to fit the facts. However, the fact a theory can be made to fit does
not mean that is should be used. Ultimately, Epstein's analysis of the Mill Act
Cases is more concerned with Lockean Theory than it is with constitutional text
or the realities of the case. As Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
famously observed in his Lochner dissent, "[t]he 14th Amendment does not
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics., 251 Even conceding that the Mill
Act Cases fit within the "bilateral monopoly/division of surplus" theory per-
fectly and that John Locke would approve of takings to provide "public goods,"
the question remains, "What does any of this have to do with whether a taking
meets requirements of the Public Use Clause?"
The only answer that Epstein provides is the rather conclusory state-
ment that his theory "is consistent with the general pattern of [the Founder's]
argument and the words in which they expressed it. '252 With only this proof,
Epstein's statement that "[tihe language of public use invites the theory of pub-
lic goods ' 53 is more conclusion than argument.
3. Duct Tape Can't Fix Everything: Assembling Epstein's Tak-
ings Theory
The overriding theme in Epstein's conceptions of the police power and
Public Use Clause is to greatly limit the situations in which the government can
take property without compensation under the police power254 while dramati-
cally expanding public use to require compensation for many types of govern-
ment action previously categorized as exercises of the police power.255 How-
ever, Epstein's analysis accomplishes more than moving the boundary line be-
tween the police power and the Public Use Clause far to the left on the state
power continuum. Epstein's theory also decreases overall state power to con-
demn in certain instances by excluding them from both the police power and the
Public Use Clause. This is illustrated in Figure 4 infra.
251 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
252 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 21, at 166.
253 Id. at 166.
254 See supra Part VIII.B.1.
255 See supra Part VHI.B.1.
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Figure 4. Epstein's Analytical Takings Framework
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Epstein's police power encompasses only nuisances that physically in-
vade neighboring land and crimes and torts involving force or fraud.256 Ep-
stein's Public Use Clause encompasses takings to provide public goods that
citizens must use, takings where the government retains ownership of the land
and uses it to provide a service that citizens can choose to use, and private tak-
ings where there is a bilateral monopoly born of necessity. However, despite his
innovative use of economic theory to draw the lines between these two con-
cepts, Epstein retains the Supreme Court's overarching analytical dichotomy
between public use and police power. Rather than articulating new categories,
Epstein's focus is on "moderat[ing] the line drawing problem" between the ex-
isting categories.25 7 Thus, Epstein's analysis shares one essential trait-and one
essential failing-with Thomas's and the majority's test in Kelo: an action must
be characterized either as police power or public use.
Despite using the same dichotomous takings model as Thomas and the
Supreme Court majority, Epstein injects a new dimension into the debate
through his careful sculpting of the police power and public use concepts. Spe-
cifically, he raises the possibility that a taking designed to effectuate some pub-
lic purpose might not be allowed under either the police power or the Public Use
Clause. In essence, those purposes fall into an analytic "void" that either pre-
256 See supra Part VIII.B. 1.
257 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 21, at 166.
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cludes state action or simply precludes analysis depending on whether Epstein's
model is used for lawmaking or analysis. These voids are depicted by the white
spaces on the state power continuum in Figure 4.258
Part VIII.B. 1 demonstrated that Epstein's police power excludes many
forms of harmful conduct and argued that a literal application of Epstein's the-
ory would allow brothels to remain in business because they do not involve
force or fraud category, are not physically invasive nuisances, and because tak-
ing them would deprive the owner of the property rights in their income.2 59 If
the police power cannot be employed here, the question becomes whether the
state can regulate through the public use rubric. Because Epstein limits public
use to three categories, this question must be broken down into three parts: (1)
whether the brothel presents a bilateral monopoly, the necessity of which justi-
fies regulation; (2) whether closing the brothel results in the government using
the land to provide a service; and (3) whether shutting down the brothel results
in the creation of a public good. The irrelevance of the first two categories
should be clear without further analysis. However, the question is a little more
difficult with regard to the third category.
The elimination of the brothel arguably can be categorized as furthering
the public purpose of health or morality (the traditional domain of the police
power). The next inquiry is whether this benefit is exclusive and whether the
marginal costs of providing it increase as the benefit is provided to more people.
At this point, the analysis breaks down. It is possible to argue the exclusivity
and cost questions either way without proving anything more than that the
analysis is poorly suited to answering the question.
This Article does not seriously suggest that a court applying Epstein's
analysis would allow the brothel to continue. Nor does it suggest that the court
would make compensation a precondition of its termination. However, the fact
that a strict application of Epstein's analysis would lead a court down this fairy-
tale road suggests that there is something seriously amiss with Epstein's analy-
sis. It is absurd to suggest that a judge would engage in an extensive analysis of
the police power and the Public Use Clause to determine whether the property
rights of a brothel owner have been violated. Certainly-read hopefully-
common sense would prevail long before this. However, the fact that Epstein's
formulations of the police power and Public Use Clause dictate such an analysis
make one of two results inevitable: courts either will ignore the analysis alto-
gether or expand the boundaries of the police power to fill in these voids.
Where the example is as ridiculous as a pimp demanding his property rights in
court, a judge most likely would pursue the former. However, in a more serious
case, the latter route is more likely.
258 The location of the different public uses and voids in relation to each other is not important
in this figure. They are laid out only to illustrate the fact that such voids exist. Thus, this Article
does not argue that the public goods are to the right of bilateral monopolies even though the figure
suggests as much.
259 See supra Part VIII.B. 1.
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The problem of "the void" exists on the benefit conference side of the
state power spectrum as well. To illustrate this, it is helpful to borrow an exam-
ple from the Supreme Court's past cases. In Midkiff, the state of Hawaii was
260faced with overly-concentrated land ownership that hurt the state's economy.
This example will exaggerate the problem in two ways. First, the majority of
the state's land will be held by only five or ten private citizens. Second, the
effects of this concentrated land ownership on the state's economy will be so
dire that they would threaten to undermine the state's solvency. These modifi-
cations are designed to put the state into a position where it must act. The ques-
tion then becomes whether the Epstein model will allow the state to act.
Epstein's conception of the police power requires an invasive nuisance,
force or fraud to operate. Unless the Hawaiian property owner acquired the
property through force or fraud, the state will not be able to use the police
power. The fact that the intangible concept of ownership cannot physically in-
vade a neighbor's land precludes the finding of a nuisance. So far, this does not
change the outcome of Midkiff because the legislature provided compensation
despite the use of a police power rationale.26' However, the outcome does
change when the state resorts to Epstein's public use rubric.
The Hawaii legislature's action cannot be called a "public good" be-
cause each property must be targeted on an individual basis. The aggregated
benefit may be public, but each instance of the taking is exclusive to the two
parties involved. This legislature's action also fails the marginal cost test be-
cause for each new citizen covered, the state must loan up to 99% of the cost.
262
Thus, the marginal cost of extending the benefit is directly proportional to the
number of people covered.
The title transfer program cannot be justified as a government-provided
service because the legislature does not plan to occupy the land and make it
available to the general public. This leaves only the bilateral monopoly argu-
ment. In Midkiff, the property owners did not want to sell because of the associ-
ated tax consequences and the tenants could not afford to buy.263 This repre-
sents a breakdown in commerce, but it is not a bilateral monopoly problem. The
landowner would suffer the same tax consequences by selling to another tenant
and the tenant's poverty would preclude purchase without regard to which prop-
erty he or she desired. Second, the Hawaii legislature does not pay a premium
to the landowner in an attempt to divide the surplus.264 Thus, the title transfer
project flunks the bilateral monopoly test on both counts, and the legislature is
left without a justifying public use for addressing the social problem caused by
the pattern of land holding.
260 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 229-30 (1984).
261 Id. at 233-34.
262 Id. at 234-37.
263 Id. at 233-35.
264 See generally Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229.
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4. The Problem of Analytical Rigidity
The fact that Epstein's model precludes Midkiff-style takings does not
necessarily reflect an analytical failure. In fact, people concerned with increas-
ing the protections for private property may find the model attractive for pre-
cisely this reason. Such people also would see the voids more as zones of pro-
tection. However, even if the theoretical problems in Epstein's analysis could
be removed, a rule requiring the government to compensate for environmental
protection, rent control statutes and other such benefits it deemed desirable, Ep-
stein's analytical framework still contains a fatal defect: rigidity.
Epstein's model is not a practical alternative for the Supreme Court be-
cause his analytical framework cannot be severed from his conservative posi-
tion. The coherence of his overarching analytical framework is completely de-
pendent upon acceptance of the boundaries that Epstein himself has set. Any
attempt to depart from these causes the framework to collapse. The modified
Midkiff example demonstrates this point simply.
The discussion of the modified Midkiff example 265 ended with two con-
clusions, the first of which was assumed. First, the state needed to employ the
title transfer program to remain economically viable. Second, the Epstein tests
for public benefits did not allow it to do so. This problem does not rise to the
theoretical level so long as a court is willing to enjoin the state from taking the
necessary action and the state is willing to abide by the court's determination.
However, such a situation places enormous pressures on a court to bend its
analysis to accommodate the necessary state action. This pressure exists even
where the state's need is not so dire but the benefit appears public and impor-
tant.
If a judge wanted to accommodate Hawaii's program, it would be nec-
essary to stretch one of Epstein's public uses. If the court stretched the public
goods rubric, a possible rationale might weigh the perceived benefit against the
marginal cost of extending the benefit to others and, concluding that the benefit
was greater than the cost, would find a marginal cost of less than zero. Simi-
larly, when analyzing "exclusivity," the court could aggregate the thousands of
individual takings to find non-exclusivity or focus the exclusivity analysis on
the indirect benefit of an improved economy. This mode of analysis has two
important implications. First, it allows the court to achieve what appears to be
the necessary or sensible result. Second, it eviscerates the public goods test,
leaving an empty shell of a rule that can be satisfied by any private takings that
confers an indirect benefit on the public. Once a court departs from Epstein's
parameters-which over the course of decades it will repeatedly be tempted to
do-no limiting principle remains that can be applied in the next case on the
court's docket. This rigidity also is present in Epstein's other categories under
265 See supra Part VI1.B.2.
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both the police power and public use because each category demands that a tak-
ing meet stringent requirements.
The inflexibility of Epstein's tests replicates the problem of the original
dichotomy between public use and police power. Once a court abandons the
idea that a taking must be for an actual public use, no clear limiting principle
remains. "Public need" is no closer to "public use" than "public benefit" or
"public convenience." Thus, once a court retreats from its original position, no
foothold exists to stop the analytical freefall. Epstein's analysis does more than
simply replicate the Supreme Court's analytical difficulties in proxy form; his
analysis necessarily reduces back to the same flawed model. Once Epstein's
categories of public use and police power are stretched beyond their original
parameters to fill the voids in state power, they lose their distinct theoretical
identities and become broad, overlapping paths to the same ultimate destination:
the question of whether the conduct is a valid exercise of the police power or
valid public use. At this point, Epstein's analytical model is no more than the
same dichotomous police power/public use analysis, with the boundary line
between these two concepts pushed far to the left on the state power continuum
to reflect Epstein's conservative views. Unfortunately for Epstein, without an
analytical limiting principle, there is nothing to stop courts from pushing this
line back to the right through the engines of liberalization.
The failure of Epstein's analytical framework to present a viable alter-
native to the Supreme Court's current model is not the product of any weakness
in his theoretical innovations. In fact, many of his proposed categories have
great analytic value. Epstein's essential failing is that, while vigorously chal-
lenging the Supreme Court's takings analysis, he passively adopts the same di-
chotomous model at the core of this analysis.
Because there is no room for a middle ground between public use and
the police power in either Epstein's or the Supreme Court's models, and because
the initial categorization of a government action is so outcome-determinative,
there is an inherent pressure to extend the police power to all government ac-
tions that a court believes should not require compensation and the Public Use
Clause to all government actions that the court thinks should require compensa-
tion. Where this process operates, categorization is reduced to conclusion.
Even categories based on initially well-articulated principles ultimately break
down as the government actions that each category encompasses become less
and less unified by any common characteristic outside of the fact that some
court, at some time, thought that one government action should be compensable
and another not. Efforts to restore coherence by rearticulating the original cate-
gories in rigid and conservative terms is not sufficient to stop this process where
the pressure of the conclusion is not removed from the issue of categorization.
It is not clear why Professor Epstein would go to the trouble of creating
a comprehensive theory of takings just to build it atop the same shaky founda-
tion as the theory he seeks to destroy. However, while it is impossible to defini-
tively guess Epstein's motivations, his complete failure to discuss the problems
occasioned by Incorporation in his comprehensive book, Takings, and his at-
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tempts to ascribe reason to the later Mill Act-Era cases forcibly suggests that
Epstein, like many eminent domain scholars, does not apprehend how far back
into history the roots of the Supreme Court's incoherent takings jurisprudence
extend. Unfortunately, Epstein's misplaced belief in an idyllic era of takings
jurisprudence blinds him to the inherent imprecision of the dichotomous takings
model. By building his own analysis on this flawed model, Epstein shackles
even his most innovative solutions to the same analytical uncertainties that they
are meant to overcome.
IX. "FROM PEGS AND HOLES TO PRACTICAL HOLDINGS": RESTORING
COHERENCE TO THE TAKINGS DEBATE BY ALTERING ITS TERMS
A. Summary and Conclusions
The specific conclusions of the foregoing sections force a broader and
more fundamental conclusion: the Supreme Court's analytical framework and
the dichotomous model on which it is predicated are incapable of producing
consistently principled and practical adjudication no matter how much they are
restated and refined. Rejecting this flawed rubric is a necessary precondition to
bringing coherence to takings law. This raises the final question that is ad-
dressed in this Article: With what can we replace this analytical framework?
B. The Way Forward
The fundamental problem with the concept of public use is that it is not
possible to stretch its rubric far enough to encompass every public appropriation
that the majority of people would regard as necessary and legitimate without
transmogrifying the term into something devoid of all intellectual integrity. At
some point, honesty must compel courts to acknowledge the simple truth that no
matter what labels or tests the court employs, there are only two categories of
valid public uses: (1) those which society always regards as legitimate and (2)
those that society sometimes regards as legitimate. Examples of the former in-
clude takings for a direct public use such as building a bridge or a road and tak-
ings where the land will be used by a "common carrier."26 Examples of the
latter include takings for a "public benefit," such as urban development or eco-
nomic growth. This principle applies with equal force to the police power.
Some exercises of the police power, such as abating recognized nuisances, are
universally deemed valid. Other exercises of the police power, such as for rent
control or environmental protection, are more controversial.
266 The "common carrier" exception allows the government to condemn land and transfer it to
private parties who operate services that all citizens may use on a non-discriminatory basis, often
upon the payment of a fee. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 21, at 168. Privately-operated railways
and parks are common examples of this. Id.
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Acknowledging that there are two categories of police power and public
use underscores the problem with a dichotomous analysis. However, it also
suggests what contours the solution should take. For two questions, there should
be two analyses and two answers. Conceptually severing the categories leads to
much greater analytic precision. Therefore, courts should reframe their takings
analysis into two questions: (1) whether the taking be categorized as a clear
exercise of the police power or a clear public use and (2) if not, then does the
taking fall somewhere between the two categories or is it entirely private?
Framing the inquiry allows a court both to determine where on the state power
continuum a given government action falls and provides clues as to how the
court should analyze it. This is represented graphically in Figure 5 below.
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Figure 5: Reconceptualizing the Dichotomy
Panel A I
4- Preventing a Public Harm 4 Creating a Public Benefit
Panel B
State Power Continuum
UClear Police Power
Takings for
Preventing Rec- '- Zone of Uncertainty/ Clear Pub-
ognized Nui- Police Power and Public Use Overlap lic Uses
sances -
Clear Public Use
This schema depicts two ideations of the state power continuum. Panel
A represents the analytical uncertainty of the prevailing dichotomous model.
While there are certain government actions that clearly fall within the ambit of
the police power and public use, state actions that fall within the vast area be-
tween these poles possess elements of both. No coherent principle justifies
stretching one or both powers across the state power continuum because it
forces courts into the zero-sum game of labeling an ambivalent state actions
either as a "clear exercise of the police power" or a "clear public use." Of
course, where the state action is not clearly a public use or an exercise of the
police power, calling it such only derogates from the precision of the categories,
leading to muddled analysis. This results in categorization-by-conclusion prob-
lem discussed earlier.
2 67
Panel B represents the conservative model of the police power/public
use dichotomy from Figure 1.268 Under this model, to which Justice Thomas
claims adherence, neither the police power nor Public Use Clause is stretched
beyond their logically defensible parameters. Unfortunately, this analytic preci-
sion exacts a heavy price because, under a dichotomous framework, a state ac-
267 See supra Part VIII.B.4.
268 See supra Part V.
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tion that neither is a public use nor an exercise of the police power cannot be
valid.269 This creates a large void under which many practical state actions fall.
A comparison of Panels A and B points toward the solution argued for
in this section: retain the clarity of Panel B and the practicality of Panel A by
creating a third analytical category which embraces the zone of ambiguity. In
practice, the four categories outlined above (two police powers and two public
uses) reduce to a three-category analysis. This is because two of the catego-
ries-(1) possible exercises of the police power and (2) possible public uses-
entirely overlap. Once a court finds that the government action is intended to
serve some public purpose, then it remains only to determine whether the action
is grounded in a state power which is not subject to the Public Use Clause's
compensation requirement-what most scholars call "exercises of the police
power"--or whether the action is grounded in state power that is subject to the
Clause's compensation requirement.270 Thus, the categories of possible public
use and possible exercises of the police power collapse into the broader category
that Figure 5 labels the "zone of uncertainty." This category is defined by the
practical consideration of whether compensation should or should not be re-
quired for a specific government action. Its boundaries are the point beyond
which compensation clearly and uncontroversially is required, on the right of
the continuum, and the point beyond which compensation clearly and uncontro-
versially is not required, on the left of the continuum. Thus, if the answer to the
compensation question is not immediately clear from the nature of the govern-
ment action, then such action falls within the zone of uncertainty.
The three categories outlined above, clear public use, clear police
power, and zone of uncertainty, are the essential building blocks of the analysis
urged by this Article. At this point, one might note that the zone of uncertainty
appears more of a restatement of the problems in takings analysis than a solu-
tion. However, this assumes that an action falling within the zone of uncertainty
eventually must be characterized as an act of the police power or of the Takings
Clause. Notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court and most takings theo-
rists feel compelled to label a taking as police power or public use, there is no
logical reason to require this step. As the analysis in the preceding sections has
shown, once a government action falls within the ambit of state power, the only
question with any practical consequence is whether compensation should be
required. Because the issue is not clear in the zone of uncertainty, there is no
reason to apply the same bright-line rules that are appropriate in the clear police
269 See supra Part VIII.B. 1 for a discussion of Justice Thomas's arguments in favor of limiting
the reach of the Public Use Clause to effectuate takings.
270 It is important to note the existence of a fifth category: government actions intended to
effectuate entirely private purposes (i.e., actions designed solely to benefit or harm a single citizen
or group of citizens). Such government actions are not within a state power and, thus, are not
represented on the state power continuum. However, the fact that this category is not represented
does not relieve a court from the duty to inquire whether the government action is public or pri-
vate. This is a threshold question, and it is only proper for a court to engage in takings analysis
after a public purpose has been found.
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power and clear public use categories. A better approach is to apply an inter-
mediate level of scrutiny to all actions in this category in order to determine
whether compensation is fair under the circumstances of the particular case.
This intermediate level of scrutiny should parallel the regulatory takings analy-
sis and specifically focus on the degree to which the government action in ques-
tion is designed to correct harm caused by the property owner-such as pollu-
tion, interference with the rights of other property owners, etc.-or confer a
public benefit.
The line between conferring a public benefit and preventing harm is dif-
ficult to draw and employing the three-category framework urged in this Article,
concededly, cannot bring it into sharper focus. However, what this framework
can do is mitigate the practical consequences of this uncertainty by abandoning
the all-or-nothing compensation approach. Many government actions, such as
urban renewal, both abate harms caused by a landowner and confer additional
public benefits. There is no reason to forbid a government that takes possession
of blighted land from doing nothing more than restoring it to its non-blighted
value. To the extent that the government can do more with the land, society
benefits all the more. However, unless the public harm that the government
seeks to abate is exactly equal to 100% of the property's value, all such takings
must result either in a net benefit or net loss to the government. In such situa-
tions, all-or-nothing compensation is not appropriate and a more enlightened-
and equitable-approach would be to assign a monetary value to the harm and
use it to offset any compensation due to the landowner for the taking.27'
The complete analytical framework proposed by this Article appears in
Figure 6 below.
Figure 6: Proposed Multi-Tiered Framework for Takings
4- Preventing a Public Harm -_ Creating a Public Benefit 01
SState Power Continuum
Clear Exercises of Rational Basis Review/ Taking for
the Police Power No Compensation Clear Public
Intermediate Scrutiny/ Uses
Scalable Compensation
Rational Basis Review/
No Compensation
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
271 This Article merely introduces this rule as a general concept. The task of defining its pre-
cise contours is appropriately left to courts to decide based on specific facts.
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Takings falling within the clear public use and clear police power cate-
gories retain the all-or-nothing compensation model whereas the zone of uncer-
tainty employs scaleable compensation. This multi-tiered framework possesses
numerous advantages over the Supreme Court's dichotomous model. However,
before these advantages may be described, principled boundaries of these three
categories should be articulated.
Three considerations must inform the process of setting boundaries for
the police power and Public Use Clause in the proposed multi-tiered framework.
First, the boundaries must be practical. When judges are forced to choose be-
tween abandoning established analyses and achieving equitable results, they
must-or at least should--choose fairness. Therefore, a takings framework
cannot force courts to make that choice if it hopes to endure. Second, the
framework must be flexible. As argued in preceding sections, rigid frameworks
tailored to accommodate specific political viewpoints will be upset completely
by changes in judicial attitude. 272 Thus, a framework must be able to accommo-
date both conservative and liberal applications without losing its coherence.
Third and finally, the framework must be constitutional. Where concepts derive
from the text of the Constitution, their boundaries must be defensible according
to the document's text.
Brief reflection on the aforementioned considerations suggests the
boundaries that should be imposed on the three categories of the multi-tiered
model. The Public Use Clause states "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation. 273 The most obvious construction of
this clause--or the one that involves the least stretching-is that it only applies
to takings for an actual public use. Justice Thomas argues this point powerfully
in his Kelo dissent.274 Unfortunately, Thomas's analysis is limited by the pres-
sures of reaching socially-desirable results. The proposed model removes that
pressure because its structure no longer requires judges to label actions a clear
public use in order to reach specific conclusions regarding the compensation or
validity questions. Under the proposed model, a court retains the flexibility to
reach a desired outcome in the zone of uncertainty. The only consequences of
such a categorization are (1) that the court will use intermediate tier scrutiny to
determine the validity of the government action and (2) that scaleable compen-
sation may be paid. Because this framework relieves the pressure on the Public
Use Clause, there is no reason not to restore the most textually-defensible read-
ing of the Clause. Therefore, the proposed model will treat only actual public
uses as "clear public uses," subject to rational basis review and mandatory com-
272 This is one of the defects in Epstein's model. See supra Part VHI.B.
273 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
274 See supra Part VIII.A.
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pensation.275 "Public goods" and other public benefits will fall into the zone of
uncertainty, where they will be subject to an intermediate tier of scrutiny.
Defining the scope of the police power does not require the same atten-
tion to constitutional interpretation as the Public Use Clause. Because the con-
cept is a judicial creation, not subject to the same deference as constitutional
text, the boundaries of the police power should be informed primarily by ana-
lytical utility. In other words, the line should be drawn where it would be most
analytically useful. This almost certainly should be the point on the state power
continuum beyond which compensation indisputably is not required. Thus, this
Article largely agrees with Epstein that the police power should be limited to
anti-nuisance and common-law crime.276 Restricting the police power in this
way allows a court to use the term in a way that has a definitive meaning and a
definitive consequence. However, because police power and residual sover-
eignty are decoupled, a court finding that an activity does not fall within the
ambit of the police power would not automatically preclude the state from tak-
ing the action or require compensation.
The final category that requires definition is the zone of uncertainty.
Now, with the boundaries of public use and the police power firmly in place,
this zone no longer is uncertain. It encompasses all state power that is not po-
lice power and which does not involve an exercise of eminent domain for use by
the public. This is the area with which the courts have struggled most. As a
result, this is the area where heightened review will allow a court to develop a
more complete factual record and actually wrestle with-as opposed to punt-
the questions of whether (1) the activity generates a public benefit or prevents a
public harm and (2) how much compensation, if any, is appropriate. With this
rubric in place, the zone of uncertainty may broadly be renamed the state stew-
ardship power, or be further reduced to several smaller categories once a suffi-
cient body of case law exists to justify principled labels.
C. Concluding Comments on the Advantages and Utility of the Multi-
Tiered Model
The multi-tiered model proposed in this section was developed to ad-
dress the specific problems identified in the first six sections of this Article. The
proposed framework should prove principled, flexible and, therefore, stable.
However it is not a panacea for every takings problem facing modem courts.
275 It is, of course possible to argue that common carriers involve actual public use even if a
citizen's physical body is not using the property. To the extent that the common carrier exception
is non-controversial, this Article would not object to including them within the category of clear
public uses. However, because a category is always easier to broaden than to narrow, the decision
whether to include common carriers is properly left to later scholars and courts.
276 This model would, however, drop Epstein's "force or fraud" requirement for the reasons
argued in supra Part VIII.B.l.
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First and foremost, the proposed model is not a prescriptive test for tak-
ings-it is only a framework. The use of heightened scrutiny for analyzing
government actions falling within the zone of uncertainty, or stewardship
power, is intended to improve protections for private property holders. How-
ever, its specific purpose is to require the government to provide a court with
clear reasons and data-instead of bare conclusions-so that the court can de-
tect government abuse. Once a court possesses these data, it still must exercise
its own judgment to resolve the compensation and validity issue. However,
under the proposed model, the court will be able to articulate the principles that
motivated its decision within a framework clear enough to enable litigants and
scholars to understand its meaning and to propound coherent criticisms. This
removes the problem of circular logic such as "it is legal because it is lawful (an
exercise of the police power)" that precludes analysis and criticism of the Su-
preme Court's current model.
The second important attribute of this model is that it balances the inter-
ests of private property owners and the government in a more meaningful way
than a single-tiered model. Epstein proposes applying intermediate-level scru-
tiny to all government takings to enhance the protections for property owners.277
This objective is laudable, but the method is overkill. Where the government
can demonstrate that the taking is designed to abate a nuisance without confer-
ring an additional public benefit or that the property actually will be used by the
public, courts should be able to weigh the merits of taking without extensive
discovery or rigorous analysis. This is especially true of actual public uses,
which can be decided by the government simply averring that the property will
be used by the public and briefly describing the method of use.
Where a case falls under the stewardship power, intermediate scrutiny
provides a valuable safeguard. The government would be required to present
evidence that its condemnation plan is designed to achieve a public benefit and
that the taking is reasonably related to achieving that public benefit. The court
need not place itself in the uncomfortable position of weighing the importance
of a benefit to the public. Rather, this scrutiny would focus on determining that
some benefit would result from the plan and the condemned property is related
to the plan. Here, again, the framework proves flexible because courts may
adjust the quantum of proof of a benefit that they require from the government
or the degree to which the property must be related to that benefit.278 This en-
ables the framework to accommodate a conservative approach-where the gov-
ernment would bear a significant burden of proof, a liberal approach-where the
government could pass the test with minimal discovery and argument, or any-
thing in between.
277 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 21, at 181.
278 This could range from the low threshold of "reasonably related" to the high standard of
"reasonably necessary" without harming the integrity of the analysis.
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A third attribute of this framework is that it balances the interests of pri-
vate property owners and the public even outside of the courtroom. Some op-
ponents of heightened scrutiny argue that it will place too great a burden on the
government and increase the cost of many socially-useful projects. 279 The
multi-tiered model accounts for this on two separate levels. First, where there is
a clear public use or exercise of the police power, the government need not go
through the time and expense of satisfying a heightened level of scrutiny. Sec-
ond, even where heightened scrutiny is used, the burden on the government will
not always be onerous. Where the validity of the government's purpose is read-
ily discernable and the connection between the action and the ultimate purpose
is straightforward, intermediate-tiered scrutiny should not entail extensive dis-
covery or a lengthy trial. However, the more questionable the government's
purpose is or the more tenuous the connection between the action and purpose
is, the harder it will be to satisfy this burden. Considering that an exercise of
eminent domain can uproot one or many families, it is not unreasonable to re-
quire the government to prove that it has a practical and reasonably forward-
thinking plan for using the properties to confer benefits.
A corollary of this principle is that if the government has invested the
requisite amount of thought and preparation prior to condemning the land, then
intermediate-level scrutiny will be less onerous as the government already
should possess much of the evidence necessary to prove its case. Where the
government has not been particularly diligent, the specter of intermediate-tiered
scrutiny provides a potent incentive to think twice before condemning property
and encourages negotiation with property owners.
The advantages of the proposed multi-tiered framework stand in stark
contrast to the faulty dichotomous analysis employed both by the Court and its
critics. A rigid analytic framework that forces courts to choose between coher-
ence and practicality under multiple ideations and over several centuries should
not be tweaked, restated, circumvented or amended; it should be immediately
and unequivocally rejected. The multi-tiered framework provides a far superior
alternative, capable of yielding consistently principled and practical judicial
determinations even as judicial attitudes towards takings changes. Accordingly,
this Article urges the Supreme Court to abandon its faulty dichotomous takings
analysis and adopt the multi-tiered model described herein. Only by doing this,
can the Court give expression to the myriad legal principles and normative val-
ues which define and drive takings jurisprudence.
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